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Introduction 
To the unsuspecting eye, Justice Anthony Kennedy's jurisprudential philosophy is a 
riddle, wrapped in a mystery, inside an enigma. 1 Indeed, even for many legal scholars, the only 
point about Justice Kennedy's jurisprudential philosophy upon which they can be maddeningly 
certain is that Justice Kennedy does not have a comprehensive jurisprudential philosophy . . The 
general consensus on Kennedy is that he is a "legal pragmatist who goes case by case," without 
"a consistent judicial philosophy to guide his decision making. "2 3 More bluntly, "the more 
closely one examines Kennedy's Supreme Court jurisprudence, the more confused one 
becomes. "4 During his Confirmation hearings, Kennedy himself admitted: 
"I do not have an over-arching theory, a unitary theory of interpretation. I am 
searching, as I think many judges are, for the correct balance in constitutional 
interpretation. "5 
Despite his own admissions that he lacks a "unitary theory," a careful study of Kennedy's 
jurisprudence reveals underlying interpretive themes. Kennedy's jurisprudential philosophy 
centers on defining the moral content of the Constitution's "spacious clauses."6 In particular, 
judges must define and enforce the full and necessary meaning of "liberty," "consistent with the 
Constitution as we understand it."7 Liberty's moral content may be illuminated by history, 
1 For quotation in its original context, see WINSTON CHURCHILL, The Russian Enigma (BBC radio address Oct. 1, 
1939). 
2 THOMAS HENSLEY, CHRISTOPHER E. SMITH, AND JOYCE A. BAUGH, THE CHANGING SUPREME COURT: 
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS AND LffiERTIES {Minneapolis/St. Paul: Wadsworth, 1997), p. 75. 
3 TINSLEY YARBOROUGH, THE REHNQUIST COURT AND THE CONSTITUTION {New York: Oxford University Press, 
2000). 
4 Patrick D. Schmidt and David A. Yalof, '"The Swing Voter' Revisited: Justice Anthony Kennedy and the First 
Amendment Right of Free Speech," 57 Political Research Quarterly 209 (2004). 
5 U.S. Senate, "Nomination of Anthony M. Kennedy to be Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United 
States," 14-16 December 1987, p. 154. 
6 FRANK J. COLUCCI, JUSTICE KENNEDY'S JURISPRUDENCE: THE FULL AND NECESSARY MEANING OF LffiERTY, 11 
(2006). 
7 Jd. at 9. See also U.S. Senate, supra, p. 86. 
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tradition, original intent, and precedent, but its full and necessary meaning may extend beyond 
these traditional sources. 8 
This paper will begin by discussing Justice Kennedy's background and basic 
jurisprudential philosophy. In Part III, I will discuss Kennedy's treatment of the Establishment 
Clause, particularly in his formulation of a "coercion principle" to protect individual's belief and 
exercise of religion from state interference. In Part IV, I will discuss Kennedy's views on 
substantive Due Process under the Fourteenth Amendment, wherein he protects private, 
consensual intimate conduct of adults through liberty. In Party V, I will discuss Kennedy's 
concept of cruel and unusual punishment, specifically in his prohibition on imposing capital 
punishment on offenders who were under the age of 18 at the time of their offense. In Part VI, I 
will discuss Kennedy's views on abortion, which shifted the constitutional foundations of the 
right to choose to abort from privacy to liberty and allowed for greater State regulation. In Part 
VII, I will discuss Kennedy's treatment of substantive Due Process under the Fifth Amendment, 
as it applies to the equal recognition of same-sex marriage. Lastly, in Part VIII, I discuss 
Kennedy's expansive conception of Free Speech, which he uses to protect political speech and 
the right to dissent, to expand the "public forum doctrine," and to protect corporate political 
expression. 
Part 1: Background 
A. The epitome of a Sacramento man 
Anthony McLeod Kennedy ("Kennedy") was born on July 23, 1936 in Sacramento, 
California to Anthony J. Kennedy and Gladys McLeod Kennedy.9 Kennedy's father, Anthony 
8 Jd. at 11 (citing Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 571 (2003)). 
9 THE SUPREME COURT HISTORICAL SOCIETY: ANTHONY KENNEDY, http://www.supremecourthistory.org/history-
of-the-court/the-current-court/justice-anthony-kennedy/) (last visited November 30, 2013). 
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"Bud" Kennedy ("Bud"), was a lawyer and lobbyist in the California legislature. 1° Kennedy's 
mother was a teacher. 11 The Sacramento that Kennedy was born into was "a very reasonable 
place" with "reasonable values."12 As several laws passed in California in the 1920s had 
weakened the established political parties, lobbyists "stepped into the vacuum to supply the 
network the parties could not."13 As a successful lobbyist, Bud Kennedy was "one of the men ... 
who made Sacramento hum" and often conducted business with liquor industry, tobacco 
industry, and manufacturing industry representatives over poker games in his backyard. 14 
Young Kennedy was a parent's dream. Kennedy was an avid reader and an excellent, 
albeit bored, student. 15 Kennedy grew up "super Catholic."16 He attended Mass every Sunday 
and was an altar boy at his local church. 17 Additionally, Kennedy was a wholesome youth whose 
faultlessness bordered on the judgmental, as he was always quick to inform his comrades when 
he believed they sinned. In the fourth grade, Bud arranged for his son to work as a page in the 
California legislature, where he became acquainted with future Chief Justice Earl Warren. 18 
Under Warren's wing, Kennedy learned intimate details of the legislative and democratic 
process. 
Kennedy graduated from McClatchy High School in 1954. 19 From there, Kennedy went 
to study at Stanford University, his father and mother's alma mater.20 Although he completed 
his undergraduate requirements in three years, at the advice of his father, Kennedy took "a year 
10 Massimo Calabresi & David Von Drehle, What Will Justice Kennedy Do?, TIME MAGAZINE (Jun. 18, 2012), 
http://content.time.com/time/subscriber/article/0.33009.2116699.00.html. 
11 See SUPREME COURT HISTORICAL SOCIETY, supra. 
12 See Massimo Calabresi & David Von Drehle, supra. 
13 ld. 
14 ld. 
15 ld. 
16 Id. 
17 Jd. 
18 Jd. 
19 ANTHONY KENNEDY BIOGRAPHY, http://www.biography.com/people/anthony-kennedy-9362868 (last visited 
November 30, 2013). 
20 See Massimo Calabresi & David Von Drehle, supra. 
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off," in which he studied at the London School ofEconomics.21 Kennedy graduated from 
Stanford University in 1958 with a Bachelor's Degree in Political Science.22 From Stanford, 
Kennedy went straight to Harvard Law School, where he graduated cum laude in 1961.23 
After law school, Kennedy served for one year in the California National Guard before 
settling in San Francisco to practice law in 1962.24 Following his father's untimely death in 
1963, however, Kennedy moved back to Sacramento, where he took over his father's law 
practice, bought a house, and married Mary Davis, a teacher and fellow Stanford graduate. 
Kennedy and Mary Davis have three children: two sons and a daughter.25 In addition to his work 
as a lawyer and a judge, Kennedy taught Constitutional Law at the University of Pacific's 
McGeorge School of Law from 1968 to 1988.26 A practical and modest man, Kennedy enjoys 
his relative anonymity compared to the massive power he holds as the Supreme Court's regular 
"swing vote."27 
B. The road to the Supreme Court is paved with Reagan's failures 
In 1967, Kennedy did assorted legal work for the then-California governor Ronald 
Reagan and his staff. 28 Notably, Kennedy drafted "Proposition 1 ," a proposed amendment to the 
California constitution to curtail the state government's power to tax and spend.Z9 Although the 
legislation was ultimately unsuccessful, Proposition 1 was a "starred credential" on Reagan's 
resume during his later presidential run.3° For his efforts, Kennedy was appointed to the Ninth 
21 Jd. 
22 See ANTHONY KENNEDY BIOGRAPHY, supra. 
23 Jd. 
24Jd. 
25 Jd. See also Massimo Calabresi & David Von Drehle, supra. 
26 See ANTHONY KENNEDY BIOGRAPHY, supra. 
27 See Massimo Calabresi & David Von Drehle, supra. 
28 Jd. 
29 Jd. 
30 Jd. 
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Circuit Court of Appeals in 1975, at the recommendation of Reagan to then President Gerald 
Ford. 31 At 3 8, Kennedy became the youngest Court of Appeals judge in the country. 
In 1987, Ronald Reagan nominated Kennedy to fill the Supreme Court Associate Justice 
position vacated by Justice Louis Powell's retirement.32 Kennedy was Reagan's third choice for 
the position. Reagan's initial nominee, Robert Bork, was blocked by Senate democrats, and his 
second option, Douglas Ginsburg, withdrew his nomination due to controversy involving his past 
marijuana use. 33 The Senate unanimously confirmed the "squeaky-clean" Kennedy by a 97-0 
vote on February 3, 1988.34 
C. The man, the myth, the decider 
When he was first nominated, Kennedy's background and demeanor suggested he would 
not be much of a change from the retiring "center-right" Justice Powell.35 Kennedy's time on the 
Ninth Circuit was marked by his cautious approach and his tendency to "hew closely to 
established doctrine."36 As expected, in his first term, Kennedy voted along conservative lines, 
voting with Chief Justice Rehnquist and Scalia over 90% of the time. 37 Kennedy's voting 
allegiances would, however, change, most notably beginning with the Planned Parenthood of 
Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey38 decision. 
Now, Kennedy is arguably the least predictable Supreme Court justice in terms of voting. 
The deciding "swing" vote in many controversial cases, the Supreme Court under Kennedy's 
quarter of a century tenure has often been referred to as the "Kennedy Court."39 And why not? 
31 Jd 
32Jd 
33 ld 
34 See ANTHONY KENNEDY BIOGRAPHY, supra. 
35 See Massimo Calabresi & David Von Drehle, supra. 
36ld 
37 See ANTHONY KENNEDY BIOGRAPHY, supra. 
38 Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992). 
39 Adam Litpak, The Fragile Kennedy Court, N.Y. TIMES, July 7, 2006, at sec. A, p. 16. 
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Since his appointment in 1988, Kennedy has been a member of the majority more than any other 
Supreme Court justice.40 In fact, during the 2006-2007 term, Kennedy was a member of the 
majority in all24 cases decided by a 5-4 vote.41 His former clerks and supporters are careful to 
note that Kennedy's seemingly random jurisprudential decisions are a result of his open-
mindedness rather than indecisiveness.42 Neal Katyal, President Barack Obama's former 
Solicitor General, states, "[Kennedy] agonizes about trying to make the right decision, instead of 
trying to fit the case into some formulaic box.'A3 Alex Kozinski, his former law clerk and the ) 
current Chief~ the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeal, adds, "[Kennedy] tr[ies] out an idea 
for size, like trying on a hat," then sees if it looks good on him or not before making a decision.44 
In light of Kennedy's fluid jurisprudential philosophy, many lawyers have begun filing 
"Kennedy briefs" that are written by his former clerks and borrow heavily from his prior 
decisions.45 Despite all attempts to stack the deck in their favor, the Kennedy briefs have not 
guaranteed the desired results and Kennedy's decisionmaking "remain[ s] unknowable." 
Part II: Jurisprudential philosophy 
A. Give me liberty or give me liberty 
Justice Kennedy's jurisprudential philosophy centers on ensuring that the word "liberty" 
is given "its full and necessary meaning, consistent with the purposes of the Constitution as we 
understand it."46 For Kennedy, the Constitution contains "spacious phrases," phrases with 
general concepts that contain moral content.47 A judicial duty exists to find the full and 
4
° FRANK J. COLUCCI, supra, at p. 1. 
41 See SCOTUS BLOG, Fina/5-4 decisions in OT06 (http;//www.scotusblog.com/movabletype/archives/Final5-
4visual.pdf). 
42 See Massimo Calabresi & David Von Drehle, supra. 
43 ld. 
44 Jd. 
45 ld. 
46 See U.S. Senate, supra, p. 154, 122. 
47 FRANK J. COLUCCI, supra, at p. 11. 
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necessary meaning of the Constitution's spacious phrases, and enforce the moral concepts within 
it. To perform this duty, judges must engage in case-by-case moral arguments "about the nature 
of liberty, human personality, and human dignity, as well as the judicial power to enforce 
them."48 While the moral idea of liberty is "amorphous" and "wavering," uncertainty over the 
precise standards of interpretation does not excuse judges from their expansive duty of 
attempting to define and enforce liberty's moral content.49 
When questioned at his Confirmation hearing on what factors a judge should consider 
when determining what the Constitution protects under liberty, Kennedy answered: 
"a very abbreviated [non-exclusive] list of the considerations are the essentials of 
the right to human dignity, the injury to the person, the harm to the person, the 
anguish to the person, the inability of the person to manifest his or her own 
personality, the inability of a person to obtain his or her own self-fulfillment, the 
inability of a person to reach his or her potential. "50 
Kennedy rejects the Originalist' s position that the only sources for Constitutional 
interpretation are the Constitution's text and original meaning at the time of its passage. While 
Kennedy finds some link to the Framers' ideas as necessary for the judge's ruling to seem 
legitimate, a historical study of the Constitution alone is insufficient to define and enforce the 
moral concepts of liberty within it. 51 Kennedy notes, "Over time the intentions of the Framers 
are more remote from their particular political concerns and so they have ... a certain generality 
now that they did not have previously."52 The Constitution "cannot be divorced from its logic 
and language, the intention of its framers, the precedents of the law, and the shared traditions and 
historic values of our people."53 Had the Framers intended for the Constitution's text and 
48 Jd. 
49 See U.S. Senate, supra, p. 31. 
50 d l . at p. 180. 
51 FRANK J. COLUCCI, supra, at p. 4. 
52 US Senate, supra, p. 180. 
53 Anthony M. Kennedy, "Rotary Speech," Sacramento, Rotary Club, Oct. 15, 1987, p. 7. 
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original meaning to explicitly answer every Constitutional issue raised thereafter, the Framers 
would not have used general, spacious phrases like due process or cruel and unusual 
punishment. 54 Instead, judges must exercise their own independent judgment to define and 
enforce the moral content of liberty embodied in the Constitution's spacious clauses. 
B. Stare decisis and non-traditional sources 
To ensure that liberty is given its full and necessary meaning, the Constitution's moral 
concepts themselves, rather than their prior interpretations, must provide the basis for 
"determining the extent of the personal liberty that courts have a duty to enforce. " 55 Kennedy 
criticizes judges "make a quick bow to the words and text and then go off into . . . [a] mass of 
precedents."56 As explained earlier, a judge's responsibility is to ensure that liberty is given its 
full and necessary meaning, consistent with the purposes of the document as we understand it. "57 
It logically follows that a self-aware judge must then determine whether the Constitution's moral 
concepts "extend ... to situations not previously addressed by the courts, to protections not 
previously announced by the courts."58 Thus, under Kennedy's jurisprudential philosophy, 
judges must act like "architects" to "preserve the best elements of our past and to create 
structures that meet the demands of a dynamic present and an uncertain future. "59 
To develop their architectural plan, judges may rely upon traditional and non-traditional 
sources to provide "objective referents" to help define and enforce the moral content of liberty. 
The Constitution's text, tradition, and history are the starting point, but not necessarily the 
54 /d. at p. 6. 
55 FRANK J. COLUCCI, supra, at p. 13. 
56 US Senate, supra, p. 231. 
57 /d. at 154, 122 (emphasis added). 
58 Anthony M. Kennedy, "Comments at Ninth Circuit Judicial Conference," Hawaii, Aug. 21, 1987, pp. 6-7, 87. 
59 
"Pasadena Dedication," Pasadena, California, Special Session of the Judges of the Ninth Circuit, Feb. 3, 1986, p. 
10. 
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ending point, for constitutional interpretation. 60 While the moral content of the Constitution may 
be illuminated by history, tradition, original intent, and precedent, the full and necessary 
meaning of liberty may extend beyond those sources.61 Accordingly, Kennedy's opinions have 
cited to social science research, the direction of political consensus ("evolving standards of 
decency"), and international law to provide "objective referents" for the moral content of liberty 
in our Constitution.62 Kennedy's opinions have relied upon such sources, even when such 
citations have ultimately led him to overturn past precedents and recant his own earlier votes. 63 
Kennedy supports the use of a variety of sources, provided that the source aids in the substantive 
consideration of whether the specific case's challenged action violates "the essentials of the right 
of human dignity," results in "the inability of the person to manifest his or her own personality, 
the inability of a person obtain his or her self-fulfillment, or the inability of a person to reach his 
or her potential."64 The type of source appears inconsequential, so long as it allows the judge to 
"discover the true nature of the substantive moral ideas stated in the text of the Constitution."65 
Part III: The Establishment Clause 
"Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion. "66 
Kennedy's interpretation of the Establishment Clause distinguishes between government 
action that accommodates religion versus government action that establishes religion. 67 As 
discussed below, government action may accommodate to put religion on equal footing with 
secular activities. Government action that requires an individual's forced rather than voluntary 
60 Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 857 (1998). 
61 FRANK J. COLUCCI, supra, at p. 11 (quoting Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 571). 
62 I d. at p. 36. 
63 See FRANK J. COLUCCI, supra, at 30 (referring to Roper v. Simmons, discussed infra). 
64 U.S. Senate, supra, at p. 180. 
65 See FRANK J. COLUCCI, supra, at p. 4. 
· 
66 U.S. Const. amend. I. 
67 See generally FRANK J. COLUCCI, supra, at p. 14. 
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participation e~t,~P{~sqes reFgi~~ Kennedy's "coercion principle," his "ideal of liberty of 
conscience against government coercion" in the belief and exercise of religion. 68 
A. Establishing the coercion principle prior to Lee v. Weisman 
For Kennedy, the Free Exercise Clause and Establishment Clause preserve the uniquely 
personal liberty decision to practice religion as one pleases without government interference. 69 
Prior to his landmark Establishment Clause decision in Lee v. Weisman, Kennedy formulated the 
foundations for his coercion principle in Allegheny County70 and Board of Education of Westside 
Community Schools. 71 Conservatives on the Court, most notably Scalia, who mistook 
Kennedy's position in these cases for Originalism would later harshly rebuke Kennedy in 
Weisman for "betraying the Constitution."72 
In Allegheny County, Kennedy voted to uphold the constitutionality of a menorah display 
and creche display on public property in downtown Pittsburgh.73 Criticizing the majority's 
"unjustified hostility towards religion," Kennedy held that the Constitution "permits government 
some latitude in recognizing and accommodating the central role religion plays in our society." 74 
Kennedy carefully distinguished between government action which "accommodates" religion 
versus government action that "establishes religion." 75 The government can neither coerce 
support or participation for a religion, nor give direct benefits to a religion in such a way that 
establishes or tends to establish a religious faith. 76 The government may, however, recognize 
68 See generally id. 
69 See generally id. 
70 Allegheny County v. Greater Pittsburgh ACLU, 492 U.S. 573 (1989) (Kennedy, A., concurring in part, dissenting 
in part). 
71 Bd. ofEduc. of Westside Cmty. Sch. v. Mergens By & Through Mergens, 496 U.S. 226 (1990) (Kennedy, A., 
concurring). 
72 See generally FRANK J. COLUCCI, supra, at p. 14. 
73 Allegheny County, 492 U.S. at 573. 
74 !d. at 655. 
75 !d. at 659. 
76 !d. 
-----
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religion through "passive and symbolic accommodation."77 Such accommodation does not 
breach the Establishment Clause unless the government "benefits religion in way more direct and 
more substantial than practices that are accepted in our national heritage."78 Joined by Justices 
Rehnquist, Scalia, and White, Kennedy found the menorah and creche displays within the realm 
of"flexible accommodation."79 The displays neither advanced one faith over another, nor 
compelled others to observe or participate. 80 Observers were free to view, ignore, or easily avoid 
the displays.81 As such, there was no "realistic risk" that the displays constituted state actions to 
establish religion. 82 
In Board of Education of Westside Community School, Kennedy voted to uphold federal 
legislation that required secondary schools receiving federal aid to allow equal after-school 
access to student groups based on "religious, political, philosophical, or other content."83 
Allowing religious groups equal access to the school after hours was an "incidental benefit" that 
placed the religious groups on "the same footing" as secular school groups. 84 There was no risk 
of state establishment of religion because the government was in no way coercing students to 
participate in a religious activity, even though that religious activity took place on school 
property.85 Like the observers of the religious displays in Allegheny County, children could 
choose to participate in the religious groups, ignore them for secular groups, or participate in 
77 ld at 661-662. 
78 Jd at 662-663. 
79 I d. at 662. 
80 ld 
81 Jd. 
82 ld at 663-664. 
83 Ed ofEduc. of Westside Cmty. Sch. , 496 U.S. at 226. 
84 I d. at 260. 
85 I d. at 261. 
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nothing. Foreshadowing Weisman, Kennedy does note that "the line between voluntary and 
coerced participation may be difficult to draw."86 
B. Lee v. Weisman: the "coercion principle" (majority opinion# 1) 
In Lee v. Weisman, writing for a 5-4 majority, Kennedy applied his coercion principle to 
strike an invocation and benediction given at a middle school graduation on school property as a 
violation of the Establishment Clause. 87 Kennedy initially voted that the graduation prayer was 
Constitutional and was assigned to write the majority opinion by Chief Justice Rehnquist, but 
reversed when he realized "my draft looked quite wrong."88 Ironically, Kennedy was assigned to 
write the new majority opinion striking the school prayer by Justice Blackmun, the senior justice 
of the new majority.89 
Deborah Weisman graduated from Nathan Bishop Middle School, a public school, at a 
formal ceremony in 1989.90 The school had a policy that allowed principals to invite clergy 
members to give invocations and benedictions at the school graduation.91 Clergy members who 
accepted were given a pamphlet entitled "Guidelines for Civic Occasions," informing them that 
public prayer at nonsectarian events were to be prepared with "inclusiveness and sensitivity."92 
The pamphlet further acknowledged that "prayer [was] inappropriate for some events. "93 Over 
Weisman's father's objections, a rabbi delivered an invocation and benediction at the school.94 
86 !d. at 261-262. 
87 Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992) (Kennedy, A., majority). 
88 Blackmun Papers, Box 586, Folder 6. 
89 Blackmun Papers, Box 586, Folder 9. 
90 Weisman, 505 U.S. at 581. 
91 !d. 
92 !d. 
93 !d. 
94 Jd. The text of the invocation and benediction can be found from 581-582. 
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Weisman's father filed for a temporary restraining order and later a permanent injunction 
to prohibit having invocations and benedictions during school graduation ceremonies.95 The 
district court held that the school's policy allowing school-led prayer at graduation ceremonies 
violated the Establishment Clause.96 Applying the tripartite "Lemon test,"97 the district court 
found the school-led prayer violated the first prong of the test by identifying the state with a 
religion or religion in general.98 On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the First 
Circuit found that the school-led prayer violated all three prongs of the Lemon test.99 
Kennedy's opinion focuses on his coercion principle rather than the Lemon test. 
Kennedy begins by restating the central principle of the Establishment Clause: "[the] government 
may not coerce anyone to support or participate in religion or its exercise, or otherwise act in a 
way which "establishes a [state] religion or religious faith, or tends to do so."100 Religious belief 
and expression are essential aspects of individual personality and liberty, and are "too precious to 
be either proscribed or prescribed by the State."101 Unlike the broad First Amendment 
protections afforded to free speech, which extends even to speech by the government, the 
Establishment Clause specifically prohibits state intervention in religious affairs because of 
concerns over the state's powers to coerce and indoctrinate. 102 Attributing the public school 
principal's actions to the state, the challenged school prayer violates this central principle 
through pervasive state involvement that "creat[ es] a state-sponsored and state-directed religious 
95 /d. at 584. 
96 /d. 
97 As set forth in Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971), for government activity to satisfy the Establishment 
Clause, it must: ( 1) reflects a clearly secular purpose; (2) have a primary effect that neither advances nor inhibits 
religion; and (3) avoid excessive government entanglement with religion. 
98 Weisman, 505 U.S. at 585. 
99 /d. at 586. 
100 /d. at 587. 
101 /d. at 589. 
102 /d. at 591. 
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exercise in a public school."103 Put more bluntly, by seeking "to produce a prayer to be used in a 
formal religious exercise" at an event 'which students, for all practical purposes, are obliged to 
attend," the school violated the Establishment Clause. 104 
Distinct from the challenged governmental acts in Allegheny County and Board of 
Education of Westside Community School, the prayer in Weisman took place at an event of great 
importance where "attendance and participation ... were in a fair and real sense obligatory."105 
Although the parties stipulated that attending the graduation was voluntary, Kennedy vehemently 
disagreed, stating, "to say that a teenage student has a real choice not to attend her high school 
graduation is formalism in the extreme."106 Not attending graduation would require a student to 
forfeit "intangible benefits" that motivated her through her school years, such as celebrating her 
academic success with family and friends, and to denigrate the significance of the achievement 
itself.107 The students could not choose to ignore the graduation like a creche display or choose 
not to attend or participate in the graduation like a religious after-school group, unless the student 
wanted to sacrifice some of what she had earned by reaching this academic stage. The school-
led prayer violated Kennedy's coercion principle by placing dissenting students in an "untenable 
position," using the inevitable choice to attend one's school graduation to coerce students into 
forced participation in state-sponsored religion. 108 
Kennedy is quick to note his heightened concerns at protecting the freedom of conscience 
of schoolchildren in elementary and secondary public schools. 109 Research indicates that 
103 ld. at 586. 
104 Id. at 588-589. 
105 ld. at 586. 
106 I d. at 595( emphasis added). 
107 ld. at 595-596. 
108 See generally id. at 593. 
1o9 Id. 
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students of such a young age and in a group environment have a tendency towards conformity. 110 
At a graduation ceremony in particular, young students are in a highly-controlled environment 
where there is public pressure and peer pressure on attending students to stand as a group or, at 
the very least, maintain respectful silence. 111 Objectors are "placed in the dilemma of 
participating, with all that implies, or protesting."112 Dissenting students can either cause a scene 
by adhering to their beliefs or sacrifice their beliefs to avoid embarrassment and unwanted 
attention. Kennedy concludes, "[i]t is a tenet of the First Amendment that the State cannot 
require one of its Citizens to forfeit his or her rights and benefits as the price of resisting 
conformance to state-sponsored religious practice."113 For Kennedy, the choice alone produces 
an intrusion on the individual's liberty of conscience against government coercion in the belief 
and exercise of religion. 
Part IV: Substantive Due Process and the 14th amendment 
A. Lawrence v. Texas: Protecting Private Conduct Through Liberty (majority opinion# 2) 
In Lawrence v. Texas114, writing for a 5-4 majority, Kennedy held that a Texas statute 
proscribing two persons of the same sex from engaging in certain intimate sexual conduct 
violated the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause by "impinging on the exercise of 
liberty" of adult males to engage in consensual sodomy in the privacy of their own homes. 115 
Lawrence expressly overruled the Court's opinion in Bowers v. Hardwick, where the court held 
that a Georgia statute proscribing sodomy did not violate the fundamental rights of homosexuals 
because the Constitution did not confer upon homosexuals a right to engage in sodomy. 116 
110 ld. 
111 See FRANK J. COLUCCI, supra, at p. 19. 
112 Weisman, 505 U.S. at 593. 
113 Jd. at 596. 
114 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003)(Kennedy, A., majority). 
115 ld. at 564. 
116 Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 189-190 (1986). 
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Kennedy's Lawrence opinion criticizes Bowers for focusing too narrowly on whether the 
Constitution protected a "fundamental right [of] homosexuals to engage in sodomy," 
"misapprehend[ing] the claim of liberty there presented."117 Instead, Kennedy protects such 
private activity through the full and necessary meaning of liberty, which "presumes an autonomy 
of self that includes freedom of thought, belief, expression, and certain intimate conduct."118 
Texas police officers were sent to John Geddes Lawrence's apartment in response to a 
weapons disturbance. 119 There, the officers observed and arrested Lawrence and another man for 
engaging in "deviate sexual intercourse," anal sex with a member of the same sex. 120 Both men 
were adults at the time of the offense, their conduct was consensual, and the acts were conducted 
in private. 121 Petitioners challenged the statute as a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment's 
Equal Protection Clause. 122 The trial court convicted Petitioners, and Court of Appeals for the 
Texas Fourteenth District affirmed the conviction. 123 
Consistent with his jurisprudential philosophy, Kennedy's Lawrence opinion uses the full 
and necessary meaning of liberty to protect the private, homosexual conduct of consenting adult 
males. 124 Using liberty rather than privacy to protect such conduct avoids textual objections, 
bringing the issue's "moral and practical considerations" to the forefront. 125 At his confirmation 
hearing, Kennedy stated, "[the] concept of liberty is quite expansive, [and] quite sufficient, to 
protect the values of privacy that Americans legitimately think are part of their constitutional 
117 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 567. 
118 /d. at 562. 
119 Id. at 563. 
120 !d. 
121 /d. at 564. 
122 !d. at 563. 
123 !d. at 564. 
124 ld. 
125 Frank J. Colucci, supra, at p. 22. 
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heritage."126 As such, Kennedy frames the issue as "whether the petitioners were free as adults 
to engage in the private conduct in the exercise of their liberty under the Fourteenth 
Amendment's Due Process Clause."127 The Bowers court's prior formulation of the issue, 
"whether the Federal Constitution confers a fundamental right upon homosexuals to engage in 
sodomy,"128 failed to "appreciate the extent of the liberty at stake."129 Kennedy explains: 
"To say that the issue in Bowers was simply the right to engage in certain sexual 
conduct demeans the claim the individual put forward, just as it would demean a 
married couple were it to be said marriage is simply about the right to have sexual 
intercourse." 130 
Unlike the Bowers court, the Lawrence court does not "misapprehend the claim of liberty 
there presented to it."131 Kennedy makes his holding clear: "adults may choose to enter upon 
this relationship in the confines of their homes and their own private lives and still retain their 
dignity as free person."132 Both the statute in Bowers and the statute in Lawrence sought to 
control an adult, homosexual male's personal relationship" by controlling "private human 
conduct [and] sexual behavior, and in the most private of places."133 The full and necessary 
meaning of liberty, however, presumes an autonomy of self that includes "freedom of thought, 
belief, expression, and certain intimate conduct."134 By impinging on the consensual, intimate 
sexual conduct of adult homosexual males in the privacy of their own homes, the State becomes 
a dominant presence in a place in which it should not be present at all. 135 Such intrusion 
demeans the homosexual individual and his relationship, stigmatizing their relationship as less 
126 See U.S. Senate, supra, p. 20. 
127 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 564. 
128 Bowers, 478 U.S. at 190. 
129 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 567. 
130 !d. at 567. 
131 Jd. 
132Jd. 
133 Jd. 
134 Jd. at 562(emphasis added). 
135 See generally id. 
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worthy than more traditional relationships and leaving a permanent mark on the individual's 
personality and his permanent criminal record. 136 Kennedy concludes: 
"When sexuality finds overt expression in intimate conduct with another person, 
the conduct can be but one element in a personal bond that is more enduring. The 
liberty protected by the Constitution allows homosexual persons the right to make 
this choice."137 
Kennedy's Lawrence opinion is also notable for its reliance on traditional and 
nontraditional sources in reaching its conclusion. Kennedy uses precedent, history, and tradition 
as a starting point for his analysis. 138 The precedent prior to Bowers indicated that the protection 
of liberty under the Due process Clause had a "substantive dimension of fundamental 
significance in defining the rights of the person."139 In Eisenstadt, the court held: 
" if the right to privacy means anything, it is the right of the individual, married or 
single, to be free from unwarranted intrusion into matters so fundamentally 
affecting a person as the decision whether to bear or beget a child."140 
Further, in Roe v. Wade, the court held that a woman's right to choose to abort was 
deserving of "real and substantive protection" as an exercise of her liberty under the Due Process 
Clause. 141 The precedent following Bowers appeared to limit the scope of Bowers's holding. 142 
In Casey, the court held that our laws and traditions afford constitutional protection to intimate 
personal decisions relating to "marriage, procreation, contraception, family relationships, child 
rearing, and education."143 Writing for the majority, Kennedy stated: 
"These matters, involving the intimate and personal choices a person may make in 
a lifetime, choices central to personal dignity and autonomy, are central to the 
liberty protected by the Fourteenth Amendment."144 
136 See generally id. at 575. 
137 /d. at 567. 
138 See generally id. at 572. 
139 !d. at 565. 
140 Jd.(quoting Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972)). 
141 Jd.(quoting Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973)). · 
142 /d. at 573-575. 
143 /d.at 574(quoting Casey, 505 U.S. at 851). 
144 /d.(quoting Casey, 505 U.S. at 851). 
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Kennedy's Lawrence opinion extends this Casey rationale to persons in homosexual 
relationships. 145 Similarly, in Romer v. Evans, the court, with Kennedy again writing for the 
majority, struck down on Equal Protection grounds Colorado legislation which explicitly refused 
to recognize homosexuals as a protected class. 146 147 
Next, Kennedy's Lawrence opinion looks to the history and tradition of our laws. 
Kennedy finds that the United States has no longstanding history of laws "directed at 
homosexual conduct as a distinct matter."148 Laws which did prohibit sodomy prohibited 
"noncreative sexual activity more generally," with no regard to whether the participants were of 
the same or opposite sex. 149 Moreover, laws which prohibited sodomy do not seem to have been 
enforced against "consenting adults acting in private."15° Kennedy finds no "ancient roots," 
language used by the Bower court, in American laws targeting same-sex couples. 151 Such laws 
did not develop until the 1970s, and, even then, were only enacted by nine states. 152 Further, 
many states that passed laws targeting same-sex couples have since moved towards abolishing 
those laws over the past few decades. 153 The only "ancient roots" for condemnation of 
homosexual behavior stem from religion and traditional concepts of right and acceptable 
behavior. 154 Kennedy matter-of-factly states that such consideration is not determinative for the 
145 Jd. Kennedy notes, "[t]he decision in Bowers would deny [persons in homosexual relationships] this right." Jd. 
146 Jd. at 574-575(quoting Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996)). 
147 Kennedy admits there it is "tenable" that Lawrence, like Romer v. Evans, could be decided on Equal Protection 
grounds. !d. at 575. Kennedy chooses to invalidate Lawrence through the Due Process Clause, with a focus on 
liberty, to prevent Bowers from having "continuing validity." !d. If Bowers remained binding precedent, the 
constitutionality of a law prohibiting both same-sex and different-sex participants could still be questioned. !d. 
148 ld. at 568. 
149 ld. 
150 !d. at 569. 
151 !d. at 570. 
152 ld. 
153 ld. 
154 ld. at 571. 
I 
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Court, and, quoting his majority opinion in Casey, notes, "our obligation is to define the liberty 
of all, not to mandate our own moral code."155 
More controversially, Kennedy relies heavily on "emerging awareness" within the United 
States and comparative international law to buttress his Lawrence analysis. Kennedy declares, 
"history and tradition are the starting point, but not in all cases the ending point of the 
substantive due process inquiry."156 The expansive duty to define and enforce liberty's full 
meaning and moral content under the Constitution may necessitate that the judge find "objective 
referents" for liberty in non-traditional sources, such as emerging awareness and international 
law. In reviewing the laws and traditions of the United States over the past half century, 
Kennedy notes an emerging awareness that "liberty gives substantial protection to adult persons 
in deciding how to conduct their private lives in matters pertaining to sex."157 In 1955, the 
American Law Institute declined to recommend or provide for criminal penalties for consensual 
.. i~xual relations conducted in private. 158 Further, when Bowers was decided in 1986, 25 states 
" w~ had laws proscribing sodomy. 159 Since Bowers, the number of states proscribing sodomy 
hai' been reduced to 13 states, of which only four states enforce such laws only against 
homosexual conduct. 160 Even where sodomy is proscribed, there is a "pattern of nonenforcement 
with respect to consenting adults acting in private," including in Texas as of 1994.161 Next, 
Kennedy considers the comparative international law of other countries with similar Judeo-
Christian moral and ethical standards. 162 5 years prior to Bowers, the European Court of Human 
Rights ("ECHR") held that "laws proscribing ... [consensual homosexual conduct] were invalid 
155 !d.( quoting Casey, 505 U.S. at 833). 
156 ld at 572. 
157 Jd 
158 ld 
159 ld at 573 . 
160 ld 
161 Jd(citing State v. Morales, 869 S.W.2d 941, 943 (Tex. 1994)). 
162 ld at 572. 
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under the European Convention on Human Rights."163 This declaration was authoritative when 
Bowers was decided and remained authoritative after Bowers was decided, despite the fact that 
the ECHR's membership has expanded from 21 nations to 45 nations during that time. 164 
At the time of Lawrence, the position in Bowers seemed unique to the United States. 
--{,~ ,.1 , "~ vVy~\Y 
v \)~ 
While Kennedy admits that "stare decisis is essential ... to the stability of the law," he continues 
to say that "[stare decisis] is not, however, an exorable command."165 The Constitution's moral 
concepts themselves, rather than their prior interpretations, must provide the basis for 
"determining the extent of the personal liberty that courts have a duty to enforce."166 Here, 
Bowers lacked the detrimental individual and social reliance that is typical of most precedent. In 
fact, Bowers itself"cause[d] uncertainty," as precedents before and after Bowers, subsequent 
actions by state legislatures, and international law conflicted with Bowers' central holding. 167 
Kennedy bluntly declares, "Bowers was not correct when decided and [is] not correct today." 168 
Overruling Bowers, Kennedy holds that in the exercise of their liberty, adults may engage in 
intimate, consensual sexual conduct with members of the same-sex "in the confines of their 
homes and their private lives and still retain their dignity as free persons."169 
Part V: Cruel and Unusual Punishment 
A. Roper v. Simmons: the "emerging awareness" on juvenile death penaltv170 (majority 
opinion #3) 
163 Jd. at 573(quoting Dudgeon v. United Kingdom, 45 Eur. Ct. H.R. (1981)). 
164 !d. 
165 !d. at 577. 
166 FRANK J. COLUCCI, supra, at p. 4. 
167 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 577. 
168 !d. at 578. 
169 ld. at 567. 
170 In addition to Roper, Kennedy wrote the majority opinion in Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407 
(2008)(prohibiting death penalty where individual's crime did not result in death of the victim) and joined the 
majority opinion in Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002)(Eighth Amendment prohibits the execution of mentally 
handicapped offenders). 
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In Roper v. Simmons171 , writing for a 5-4 majority, Kennedy held that the Eighth and 
Fourteenth Amendment forbid imposing the death penalty on offenders who were under age 18 
at the time their capital crimes were committed. 172 Roper expressly overruled the Court's 
decision in Stanford v. Kentucky, where the court held that the Eighth and Fourteenth 
Amendments did not proscribe the execution of offenders who were over the age of 15 but under 
18 as cruel and unusual punishment. 173 The majority opinion in Stanford, written by Scalia and 
joined by Kennedy, indicated there was no national consensus on whether the execution of 
offenders aged between 15 and 18 years old was proscribed by the Constitution, as 22 of 3 7 
death penalty states permitted the execution of 16 year old offenders and 25 of 3 7 permitted it for 
17 year old offenders. 174 
At age 17, Christopher Simmons and two even younger confederates conspired to and 
committed murder. 175 Simmons detailed his plan to break into a woman's home, burgle her 
home, tie her up, and throw the victim off of a bridge. 176 Simmons and his two co-conspirators 
performed their plan to the letter, concluding with their tying the victim up with electrical wire 
and throwing her off a bridge, leaving her to drown in the waters below. 177 Simmons was 
arrested and charged, inter alia, with murder. 178 He waived his Miranda rights and made a full 
confession. 179 
171 Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005)(Kennedy, A., majority). 
172 Roper, 543 U.S. at 578. 
173 Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361 (1989). 
174 ld. 
1~ s Roper, 543 U . . 556. 
176 Id. 
177 ld. at 556-557. 
178 !d. at 557. 
179 ld. 
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By the time Simmons was tried and sentenced, he had turned 18. 180 The State of 
Missouri sought the death penalty for Simmons. 181 Defense counsel reminded the jury that 
people of Simmons' age "cannot drink, serve on juries, or even see certain movies, because 'the 
legislatures have wisely decided that individuals of a certain age aren't responsible enough. "'182 
The jury recommended the death penalty for Simmons, and the judge accepted their 
recommendation. 183 The Missouri trial court denied Simmons' motion for post-conviction relief 
by reason of ineffective assistance of counsel. 184 Subsequently, the Supreme Court decided 
Atkins v. Virginia, in which it held that the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments prohibited the 
execution of mentally handicapped persons. 185 Simmons filed a new petition for state 
postconviction relief, arguing that Atkins established that the Constitution prohibited the 
execution of juveniles who were under the age of 18 when they committed their capital 
offense. 186 The Missouri Supreme Court agreed, and resentenced Simmons to "life 
imprisonment without eligibility for probation, parole, or release except by act of the governor," 
citing the "national consensus ... against the execution of juvenile offenders."187 188 
Like liberty, "cruel and unusual punishment" is a spacious phrase in the Constitution. 
Judges have an expansive duty to find the full and necessary meaning of "cruel and unusual 
punishment," and enforce the moral concepts within it.189 To perform this duty, judges must 
engage in case-by-case moral arguments "about the nature of liberty, human personality, and 
180 !d. at 556. 
181 Jd. at 558. 
182 Jd 
183 Jd 
184 !d. at 559. 
185 Atkins v. Virginia, 543 U.S. 304 (2002). 
186 Roper, 543 U.S. at 560. 
187 /d. at 560. 
188 Interestingly, in a later opinion, Graham v. Florida, 130 S.Ct. 2011 (2010), Kennedy holds that the Eighth 
Amendment prohibits imposing life sentences without the possibility of parole on juveniles who have not committed 
murder. As Simmons committed murder, even if Graham had been in place, he still would have received a life 
sentence without the possibility of parole. 
189 See generally FRANK J. COLUCCI, supra, at p. 11. 
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human dignity, as well as judicial power to enforce them.190 Imposing the death penalty on 
juvenile offenders classifies as cruel and unusual punishment because of the extent to which it 
disproportionately violates the juvenile offender's liberty. The death penalty prevents the 
juvenile offender from ever manifesting his or her personality, from obtaining his or her own 
self-fulfillment, and prevents the individual from ever reaching his or her potential, all of which 
are factors protected by the Constitution under the full and necessary meaning ofliberty. 191 
Kennedy's entire analysis in Roper revolves around finding the juvenile offender less 
capable than an adult offender who commits a similar crime, as the juvenile offender has not yet 
fully developed his personality or fixed his traits to become who he will ultimately be. 192 The 
death penalty is the "most severe punishment," ... [and] should be limited to those offenders who 
commit "a narrow category of the most serious crimes" and whose extreme culpability makes 
them "the most deserving of execution."193 Kennedy states that juvenile offenders "cannot be 
classified with reliability among the worst offenders" in the way that adult offenders can be. 194 
First, juveniles lack maturity and have an underdeveloped sense of responsibility, resulting in a 
proclivity for impetuous, ill-considered actions. 195 Second, juveniles are more susceptible to 
negative influences and outside pressures than adults. 196 Quoting precedent, Kennedy states, 
"youth ... is a time and condition when a person may be most susceptible to influence and to 
psychological change."197 Third, a juvenile's character is not as well formed as that of an adult, 
with more transitory and less fixed character traits. 198 In light of their fluid character traits, 
190 ld 
191 See generally U.S. Senate, supra, at p. 31 . 
192 Roper, 543 U.S. at 569. 
193 Jd. at 568(quoting Atkins at 319). 
194 ld at 569. 
195 Id 
196ld 
197 Jd.(quoting Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 115 (1982)). 
198 I d. at 570. 
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incomplete personality, and susceptibility for influence, the behavior of juveniles "is not as 
morally reprehensible as that of an adult."199 For Kennedy, the. juvenile offender's youth is a 
mitigating factor because "the signature qualities of youth are transient; as individuals mature, 
the impetuousness and recklessness that may dominate in younger years can subside. "200 
Sentencing a juvenile offender, such as Simmons, to the death penalty permanently stunts the 
growth of his personality and potential, before he or the Court can ever determine if the crime 
was symptomatic of an irretrievably depraved character deserving of the death penalty or if the 
crime was an uncharacteristic mistake of the man he could have become. 
Notably, Kennedy relies upon non-traditional sources to support his contention that the 
death penalty for juveniles is a "punishment[] ... so disproportionate as to be cruel and 
unusual."201 Kennedy cites to the "evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a 
maturing society," social science research, and international law to provide "objective referents" 
for the moral content of liberty. First, enactments by state legislatures and the Court's own 
determination demonstrate that the death penalty is a disproportionate punishment for juveniles. 
Kennedy remarks that the evolving standards of decency that proscribed the death penalty 
against the mentally impaired in Atkins is very similar to the national consensus to proscribe the 
death penalty against juveniles?02 30 states prohibit the juvenile death penalty, including 12 that 
prohibit the death penalty altogether and another eight states that maintain the death penalty but, 
"by express provision or judicial interpretation, exclude juveniles from its reach. "203 
Additionally, juries recommend the death penalty for juveniles very infrequently?04 Kennedy 
199 /d.(quoting Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 835 (1988)). 
200 Jd.(quoting Johnson v. Texas, 509 U.S. 350, 368 (1993))(emphasis added). 
201 ld. at 561. 
202 Jd. at 564. 
203 ld. 
204 ld. at 565. 
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posits that the slower rate of juvenile death penalty abolition over the last 15 years, in 
comparison to the abolition of the death penalty against the mentally impaired, is likely a result 
of the juvenile death penalty gaining wider recognition earlier.205 Second, Kennedy cites to 
scientific studies, sociological studies, and psychological studies to show that juvenile offenders 
do not reliably share the same culpability as adult offenders committing the same crime.206 
Lastly, Kennedy cites to international law to demonstrate that imposing the death penalty 
on juveniles constitutes cruel and unusual punishment. Kennedy points out that the "United 
States is the only country in the world that continues to give official sanction to the juvenile 
death penalty."207 Since 1990, only seven countries have executed juvenile offenders, but, other 
than the United States, all of those countries have since repudiated the practice. 208 While the 
opinion of the world community is not controlling, it does provide "respected and significant 
confirmation for our own conclusions."209 In response to Justice Scalia's vociferous dissent 
decrying reliance on "alien law" to interpret the Constitution, Kennedy continues: 
"It does not lessen our fidelity to the Constitution or pride in its origins to 
acknowledge that the express affirmation of certain fundamental rights by other 
nations and peoples simply underscores the centrality of those same rights within 
our own heritage offreedom."210 
Namely, what the traditional and non-traditional sources of Constitutional interpretation 
used by Kennedy in Roper make clear is that "when a juvenile offender commits a heinous 
crime, the State can exact forfeiture of some of the most basic liberties, but the State cannot 
extinguish his life and his potential to attain a mature understanding of his own humanity."211 
205 ld. at 566-567. 
206 ld. at 569-571. 
207 ld. at 575. 
208 ld. at 577. 
209 Id. at 578. 
210 ld. 
211 Id at 573-574. 
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Part VI: Abortion 
A. Kennedy's abortion jurisprudence prior to Casey 
Kennedy has admittedly struggled with the issue of abortion during his 25 years on the 
Supreme Court.212 In the years leading to Casey, Kennedy's opinions on abortion attempted to 
limit rather than overturn the import of the holding in Roe v. Wade.213 Specifically, Kennedy 
attempted to limit the holding of Roe in such a way that would "allow for more governmental 
regulation of the procedure while retaining a judicial role in enforcing individualliberty."214 
In Webster, the court addressed a Missouri law which required that doctors test for fetal 
age before performing an abortion, if he had reason to believe the fetus was 20 weeks or older?15 
The court held that the requirement was a reasonable regulation for promoting the State's interest 
in protecting potential human life.216 The court upheld the regulation despite the fact that the 
regulation would be unconstitutional under Roe's trimester framework? 17 While he joined the 
majority opinion, in conference, Kennedy stated that he would not find the right to abort to be a 
fundamental right under the right of privacy or the Equal Protection Clause, but rather as a 
protected liberty under the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause?18 To Kennedy, such 
a change would "return this debate to the democratic process." Kennedy's later opinions would 
show that a 'return to the democratic process" meant giving state's more latitude to regulate the 
abortion procedure, in light of their interest in promoting respect for fetal life and free and 
informed choices?19 
212 FRANK J. COLUCCI, supra, at p. 47. 
213 !d. at p. 40. 
214 !d. at p. 40, 48. 
215 Webster v. Reproductive Health Systems, 492 U.S. 490 (1989). 
216 !d. at 519-520. 
217 !d. 
218FRANK J. COLUCCI, supra, at p. 40. 
219 !d. at p. 39. 
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~ In Hodgson, the court upheld a statute that required minors to wait 48 hours prior to 
~ 220 I obtai~ an abortion, but rejected its requirement that both parents be notified of the abortion. 
Kennedy wrote a concurrence that upheld both the time delay and parental notification 
requirements, unless the minor obtained a judicial bypass.221 To justify the notification 
requirement, Kennedy cited to the states interests in (1) promoting the welfare of pregnant 
minors; and (2) acknowledging and promoting the role of parents in the care and upbringing of 
their children. 222 Kennedy emphasized the importance of family ties, both for the minors in 
making their abortion decision and for their parents's liberty interest in having a reasonable 
opportunity to develop close relations with their children?23 Mirroring later language about 
abortion decisions having "consequences beyond the fetus," here the notification requirement did 
not place an "absolute obstacle" on any minor seeking an abortion, and represented a 
"considered weighing of the competing interests of minors and their parents. "224 
In Akron Center, heard by the Court on the same day as Hodgson, the court heard a state 
that, inter alia, required physicians performing an abortion on a minor to provide timely notice to 
~ 
the minor's parent, unless the physician obtained a judicial bypass. 225 Writing for a plurality, 
Kennedy held that the law did not impose "an undue or otherwise unconstitutional burden on a 
minor seeking an abortion. "226 The language Kennedy uses lays the foundation for Casey and 
his later abortion decisions, wherein he uses liberty rather than privacy to protect the right to 
abort and justifies greater government regulation of the procedure. 227 A woman's decision to 
abort is a "grave one that will embrace her own destiny and personal dignity, and the origins of 
220 Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497 U.S. 417 (1990)(Kennedy, A., concurrence). 
22 1 !d. at 481. 
222 !d. 
223 !d. 
224 !d. at 496. 
225 Ohio v. Akron Center, 497 U.S. 502 (1990). 
226 !d. at 519-520. 
227 See generally FRANK J. COLUCCI, supra, at p. 44 
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the other human life that lies within the embryo."228 Kennedy argues that it is rational for the 
state to assume the beginning of that understanding will come from the family, and that is fair for 
the State to pass laws to allow that family to give a "lonely or even terrified minor" advice.229 
Kennedy concludes: 
"It would deny all dignity to family to say state cannot take reasonable step in 
regulating its health professions to ensure that in most cases a young woman will 
receive guidance and understanding from a parent. "230 
With his rhetoric in Akron Center, Kennedy strives to classify a woman's decision to 
abort as a philosophical choice that implicates the woman's personal destiny and dignity?31 
. Using paternalistic language, Kennedy emphasizes the gravity of the decision and the importance 
I 
/ of a family support system to advi~ the 'terrified minor."232 By demonstrating that a woman's 
decision to abort is informed by her family's advice, Kennedy sets the stage to discuss the effect 
that abortion has on the woman's family. 233 Then, to protect the woman's family and their 
liberty interest in raising and remaining close to their child, greater state regulation on abortion is 
necessary. 234 Once that has been established, Kennedy could justify greater state regulation in 
order to protect the state's own interests in a woman's decision to abort, while also upholding the 
core holding of Roe. 235 
B. Planned Parenthood v. Casey: shifting the foundation of abortion to liberty (majority 
opinion# 4) 
228 Jd. 
229 !d. 
230 Jd. 
231 See FRANK J. COLUCCI, supra, at p. 44 
232 See generally id. 
233 See generally id. 
234 See generally id. 
235 See generally id. 
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In Casey, 236 the Court reviewed the constitutionality of changes made to the Pennsylvania 
abortion statute. The proposed changes required a woman seeking an abortion to: (1) give 
informed consent prior to the procedure; (2) endure a 24 hour waiting period before the 
procedure is performed; (3) if a minor, to obtain the informed consent of one of her parents, with 
the possibility of judicial bypass; ( 4) if married, woman must sign a statement indicating 
husband has been notified.237 Additionally, the changes imposed reporting requirements on 
facilities providing abortion services.238 Prior to the provisions going into effect, petitioners, five 
abortion clinics and one physician providing abortion services, filed for declaratory and 
injunctive relief.239 Writing for a 5-4 majority, Kennedy upheld all the abortion procedure 
regulations other than the spousal notification requirement, finding that the other four regulations 
did not pose an "undue burden" on a woman's right to choose to abort.240 
In reaching this conclusion, the Court reaffirmed the holding of Roe and recast Roe's 
constitutional foundations in liberty.241 As an initial matter, the Court restates what it believes 
are the three prongs of Roe's central holding. 242 First, a woman has the right to choose to have 
an abortion before the fetus is viable243 without undue interference from the state. 244 Prior to the 
fetus' viability, the State's interests are not strong enough to support prohibiting or imposing 
substantial obstacles on a woman's right to abort. 245 Second, the State can restrict abortions after 
the fetus becomes viable, provided the law contains exceptions where the pregnancy endangers 
236 Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992)(Kennedy, A., majority). 
237 ld. at 844. 
238 Jd. 
239 Id. at 845. 
240 ld. at 879-901. 
241 ld. 846-857. 
242 ld at 846. 
243 A fetus is viable when it has a "realistic possibility of maintaining and nourishing a life outside the womb." Idat 
870. 
244 ld. 
245 Id. 
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the woman's life or health.246 Third, from the outset of the pregnancy, the State has legitimate 
interests in protecting the woman's health and the life of the fetus that may become a child.247 
Kennedy believes that this important state interest provided for in Roe has been overlooked by 
Roe's progeny.248 
Having established what Roe stands for, the Court explains why Roe should not be 
c..~ 249 overtum~d by stye decisis. When the Court reexamines a prior holding, it is customarily 
\./\~ .. 
informed by prudential and pragmatic considerations to test the consistency and respective costs 
~ 
of reaffirming or overruling a prior case. 250 Here, overruling Roe would-e~~at for 
over two decades, people have created intimate relationships and "defined themselves and their 
places in society "in reliance on the availability of abortion .. [should] contraception fail. "251 
Roe's passage has not made it so courts are likely to "hand down erroneous decisions." Kennedy 
concludes, "[t]he sum of the precedential enquiry to this point shows Roe's underpinnings 
unweakened in any way affecting its central holding. While it has engendered disapproval, it has 
not been unworkable."252 
With the central holding of Roe reaffirmed, Kennedy attempts to reclassify a woman's 
right to choose to abort as a right protected under liberty.253 Kennedy states: 
246 Jd. 
247 Id. 
248 ld. 
249 Id. at 856-860. 
250 ld. at 854. 
251 /d. at 856. 
252 Id. at 860. 
253 /d. at 846. 
"The Constitutional protection [for] the woman's decision to terminate her 
pregnancy derives from the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. It 
declares that no State shall "deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, 
without due process of law." The controlling word in the cases before us is 
"liberty."254 
254 /d.( emphasis added). 
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Kennedy recasts the right to choose to abort as a substantive liberty protected by the 
Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause. Although not expressly enumerated in the 
Constitution, Kennedy reminds the reader that not all liberties protected by the Fourteenth 
Amendment are expressly mentioned in the Constitution.255 Indeed, "the full scope of the liberty 
guaranteed by the Due Process Clause cannot be found in or limited by the precise terms of the 
specific guarantees elsewhere provided in the Constitution. "256 The Constitution's full and 
necessary meaning of liberty does, however, clearly "place[] limits on [the] state's right to 
interfere with person's most basic decisions about family and parenthood, as well as bodily 
integrity. 257 The law guarantees Constitutional protection to this type of "personal decisions" 
relating to marriage, procreation, contraception, family relationships, child rearing, and 
education. "258 In his famous "heart of liberty" passage, Kennedy makes this clear: 
/ 
( 
"These matters, involving the most intimate and personal choices a person may 
make in a lifetime, choices central to personal dignity and autonomy, are central 
to the liberty protected by the 14th amendment. At the heart of liberty is the right 
to define one's own concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the 
mystery of human life."259 
/ Beliefs about tors typtof matters could not define the "attributes of personhood" if they 
were formed under compulsion of the State?60 Given the anguish a woman would experience 
from being denied the choice to abort, majority and historical beliefs about fetal life and 
motherhood "cannot alone be grounds for the State to insist she make the sacrifice.261 Kennedy 
255 I d. at 847. 
256 Id.at 848(quoting Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S.497, 543 (196l)(Harlan, J., dissenting)). 
257 ld. at 849. 
258 Jd. at 851. 
259 ld. 
260 ld. 
261 ld. at 852. 
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declares, "[The Supreme Court's] obligation is to define the liberty of all, not to mandate our 
own moral code.262 
While the State cannot flatly prohibit a woman's right to choose to abort, the Court is 
careful to note that the consequences from a woman's choice to abort affect more than just that 
woman and her fetus. Kennedy describes the ripples cascading from a woman's choice to abort: 
"Abortion is a unique act. It is an act fraught with consequences for others: for 
the woman who must live with the implications of her decision; for the persons 
who perform and assist in the procedure; for the spouse, family, and society 
which must confront the knowledge that these procedures exist."263 
Kennedy continues, "It was this dimension of personal liberty that Roe sought to 
protect. "264 By mentioning all those affected by a choice to abort, Kennedy sets the foundation 
to discuss the interests of the other affected persons and how to protect those interests. 
Kennedy begins by establishing the State's interests in a woman's choice to abort. He 
notes, "[a] woman's liberty [to abort] is not so unlimited ... that from the outset [of pregnancy] 
the State cannot show its concern for the life of the unborn. "265 On the "other side of the 
equation" is the State's interest in protecting potential life. 266 While Roe acknowledged the 
State's "important and legitimate interest in protecting the potentiality of life," subsequent 
abortion cases have done too little to acknowledge and protect this State interest. 267 Indeed, Roe 
and subsequent cases have treated all pre-viability government attempts to influence a woman's 
decision to abort as unwarranted, choosing to completely insulate the woman until the fetus 
becomes viable at the expense of the State's interest.268 Additionally, Kennedy establishes that 
262 Id. at 850. 
263 Jd.at 852(emphasis added). 
264 Id. at 853. 
265Jd. at 869. 
266 ld. at 871. 
267 Id. at 871-872 (quoting Roe, 410 U.S. at 162). 
268 ld. at 876. 
--- - -- -------
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the State has an interest in ensuring that the woman's choice to abort is "thoughtful and 
informed," and can take steps to protect said interest, even before viability.269 
To better protect the State's legitimate interests in a woman's choice to abort, Kennedy 
abandons Roe's rigid trimester270 framework in favor of an undue burden standard?71 The Court 
found that the trimester system was not an essential part of Roe's holding.272 The trimester 
framework was not necessary to protect the woman's right to choose to abort, and, more 
importantly, was extremely ineffective in protecting the State's legitimate interests in protecting 
the potentiality of fetal life and ensuring that women made thoughtful and informed decisions on 
whether to abort?73 Instead, the Court applied the undue burden standard to state regulation of 
abortion: 
"Only when state regulation of abortion imposes an undue burden on woman's 
ability to decide whether to terminate pregnancy does power of state reach into 
heart of liberty protected by due process clause; fact that regulation has incidental 
effect of making it more difficult or more expensive to procure abortion cannot be 
enough to invalidate it. "274 
Under the undue burden standard, State regulation imposed an undue burden on a . 
woman's decision to abort if the regulation "has the purpose or effect of placing a substantial 
obstacle in the path of women who seek the abortion of a nonviable fetus."275 Regulations which 
only create structural mechanisms for the state, or a minor's parent or guardian, to "express 
profound respect for the life of the unborn" are permitted, as long as the regulation is not a 
269 Jd. at 872. 
270 Roe established a trimester system governing when the State could regulate a woman's choice to abort. ld. at 872 
(quoting Roe, 410 U.S. at 163-166). During the first trimester, almost no regulation at all is permitted. During the 
second trimester, regulations designed to protect the woman's health, but not to further the State's interest in 
potential life, are permitted. ld. During the third and final trimester, when the fetus is viable, the State may prohibit 
the woman's choice to abort, provided the mother's life or health is not at stake. Jd. 
271 ld. at 872-878. 
272 Jd. at 873. 
273 ld. at 872, 876. 
274 Jd.at 874(emphasis added). 
275 Jd.at 877(emphasis added). 
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substantial obstacle to a woman's right to choose?76 With the undue burden standard, the Court 
could reconcile the state's interests in human life and ensuring women made thoughtful, 
informed choices with the woman's constitutionally protected liberty in deciding whether to 
abort.277 Further, under the undue burden standard, the State could now more freely regulate 
abortion at the pre-viability stage. The undue burden standard protected what the trimester 
framework could not, and without sacrificing the woman's constitutionally protected liberty. 
Applying the new undue burden standard, Kennedy upheld all of the changes to the 
Pennsylvania abortion statute, with the exception of the spousal notification requirement. 278 
Kennedy upheld the informed consent requirement, 24 hour waiting period requirement, parental 
notification requirement, and reporting requirements based on the State's interest in a woman's 
decision to abort being more "informed and deliberate."279 The spousal notification requirement 
was struck as adult women would not benefit from consulting their husbands in the way minors 
would from consulting their parents?80 
Casey reverberates as a resounding success for Kennedy and his jurisprudential project. 
In Casey, Kennedy was able to modify and narrow Roe without overturning it, recast the 
foundation of abortion from privacy to liberty, and allow for greater democratic regulation of the 
abortion procedure based on moral concerns by better protecting the State's interests in 
abortion.281 
C. Stenberg v. Carhart: a step back from Casey? (dissenting opinion# 1) 
276 Jd.at 877. 
277 /d. at 876. 
278 /d. at 881-902. 
279 /d. 
280 /d. at 895. 
281 See FRANK J. COLUCCI, supra, at p. 57. 
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In Stenberg282, the Court invalidated a Nebraska statute that banned all "partial birth 
abortions," without regard to the health of the mother. The Nebraska statute defined a "partial 
birth abortion" as "an abortion procedure in which the person performing the abortion partially 
delivers vaginally a living unborn child before killing the unborn child and completely the 
delivery. 283 Carhart, a Nebraska physician who performs abortions at a clinic, filed suit that the 
Nebraska statute was unconstitutional, and sought an injunction to prevent its enforcement.284 
The district court held the statute unconstitutional and the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals 
affirmed the district court's decision.285 
In a 5-4 majority, Justice Breyer struck down the law as unconstitutional for two reasons. 
First, Nebraska's ban on partial birth abortions was unconstitutional because the law lacked any 
exception for preservation of the mother's health. 286 The Court concludes, "where substantial 
medical authority supports the proposition that banning a particular abortion procedure could 
endanger women's health, Casey requires the statute to include a health exception."287 Second, 
the Nebraska ban on partial birth abortions was unconstitutional because the statute's vague 
language could be applied to the commonly used dilation and evacuation (D & E) procedure as 
well as to the more dangerous dilation and extraction (D & X) procedure.288 Breyer explains, 
"even if the statute's basic aim is to ban D & X, its language makes clear that it also covers a 
much broader category ofprocedures."289 In prohibiting the commonly used dilation and 
282 Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914 (2000)(Kennedy, A., dissenting). 
283 Jd at 922 (quoting Neb.Rev.Stat. Ann. § 28-326(9) (Supp.1999)). 
284 Id 
285 ld 
286 ld at 936-937. 
287 ld at 938. 
288 Jdat 938-939. 
289 ld at 939. 
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evacuation procedure, the law unduly burdened women's right to choose to abort by placing a 
substantial obstacle on the ability of women to obtain an abortion.290 
Dissenting, Kennedy held that Nebraska's ban on partial birth abortions did not unduly 
burden women's ability to decide whether to terminate a pregnancy, in that the law did not have 
the purpose or effect of placing a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman seeking an abortion 
of a nonviable fetus.291 Instead, under the framework of Casey, Nebraska's law advanced its 
legitimate State interests in promoting the life of the unborn and ensuring respect for all human 
life and its potential.292 
For Kennedy, Casey is premised, inter alia, on the States having "an important 
constitutional role in defining their interests in the abortion debate. "293 Casey described the 
State's interests in promoting the life of the unborn, respect for all human life, and encouraging 
thoughtful and informed abortion decisions by women. 294 Additionally, States also have an 
interest in proscribing medical procedures which they reasonably determine "might cause the 
medical profession or society as a whole to become insensitive, even disdainful, to life, including 
life in the human fetus. "295 To protect this interest, a State can take steps to ensure that medical 
professionals are viewed as healers, who are "sustained by a compassion and rigorous ethic and 
cognizant of the dignity and value of human life, even life which cannot survive without the 
assistance of others."296 Here, in its brief, Nebraska described its interests as "including concern 
for the life of the unborn and 'for the partially-born, "in preserving the integrity of the medical 
290 ld. 
291 Jd.at 965(quoting Casey, 505 U.S. at 875). 
292 Jd.at 957(quoting Casey, 505 U.S. at 871). 
293 ld. at 961. 
294 Casey, 505 U.S. at 871-872. 
295 Stenberg, 530 U.S. at 961. 
296 Id. at 962. 
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profession, and in 'erecting a barrier to infanticide."297 Kennedy frankly states, "A review of 
Casey demonstrates the legitimate of [Nebraska's] policies. The Court should say so."298 
Kennedy takes the majority to task for failing to award any weight to Nebraska's 
legitimate State interests. His repeated use of the colorful word "abortionist" and lengthy, 
graphic description of the D & X procedure indicate his moral discomfort with the D & X 
procedure and his incredulity at the majority's opinion.299 Kennedy accuses the majority of 
viewing the procedure from ''the perspective of an abortionist," rather than from "the perspective 
of a society shocked when confronted with a new method of ending life."300 In light of 
Nebraska's intent to only ban the D & X procedure and the graphic description of the D & X 
procedure, it goes without saying that "Nebraska's ban on partial birth abortion furthers purposes 
States are entitled to pursue.301 Notably, Kennedy makes a point to discuss Justice O'Connor's 
contention that Nebraska's ban does not further its stated interests because the permitted D & E 
method is "no less dehumanizing than the [proscribed] D & X method. "302 Kennedy replies: 
"The issue is not whether members of the judiciary can see a difference between 
the two procedures. It is whether Nebraska can. The Court's refusal to recognize 
Nebraska's right to declare a moral difference between the procedures is a 
dispiriting disclosure of the illogic and illegitimacy of the Court's approach to the 
entire case."303 
Unlike the majority, Kennedy takes no issue with Nebraska's failure to include a health 
exception in its law, to allow D & X whenever the physician thinks it is best for the health of the 
woman. By deferring to the doctor's judgment through a health exception, the State would allow 
individual physicians to "set [the] abortion policy for the State ofNebraska, [rather than] the 
297 Jd. at 961(quoting Brief for Petitioners 48-49). 
298 ld. at 961. 
299 See generally FRANK J. COLUCCI, supra, at p. 59. For description ofD & X procedure, see Stenberg, 530 U.S. at 
958-960. 
300 Stenberg, 530 U.S. at 957. 
3oi Id. 
302 ld. at 962. 
303 !d.( emphasis added). 
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legislature or the people."304 Such deference would require the Court to revisit pre-Row cases, 
which gave a physician's treatment decisions controlling weight.305 Instead, Kennedy follows 
Casey, which does not give precedence to the views of a single physician or group of physicians 
regarding a particular procedure's relative safety.306 In further support, Kennedy cites to relevant 
medical authorities who opine that a health exception would be D & X unnecessary: 
"The American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists (ACOG) "could 
identify no circumstances under which [D & Xl would be the only option to save 
the life or preserve the health of the woman." App. 600-601. The [American 
Medical Association] AMA agrees, stating the "AMA's expert panel, which 
included an ACOG representative, could not find 'any' identified circumstance 
where [D & X] was 'the only appropriate alternative." 307 
Lastly, Kennedy addresses the majority's position that the Nebraska law forbade both the 
D & X procedure and the more common D & E procedure, thus unduly burdening a woman's 
right to choose to abort. 308 By making such argument, the majority contradicts Casey's premise 
that States have an important Constitutional role in defining their interests in the abortion debate 
and misapplies well-settled doctrines of statutory construction.309 Kennedy explains, "[to] 
requir[ e] a State to meet [such] unattainable standards of statutory draftsmanship in order to have 
its voice heard on this grave ... subject is no different from foreclosing state participation 
altogether. "31 0 
Turning to statutory interpretation, Kennedy states that the Nebraska law only applies to 
D & X procedures based on statutory references to "partial-birth abortion, "delivery" of a fetus," 
and requiring that delivery occur "before" the death-causing procedure? 11 First, the term "partial 
304 Jd. at 965. 
305 Jd.at 968. 
306 ld. 
307 I d. at 965-966( emphasis added). 
308 Jd. at 972. 
309 ld. at 973, 961. 
310 ld. at 973. 
311 ld. at 973-974. 
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birth abortion" is synonymous with the D & X procedure.312 Carhart's lead expert prefaced his 
description ofD & X by noting that D & X has been called "partial-birth abortion" by the lay 
press.313 The AMA agrees, stating that "the 'partial birth abortion' legislation is by its very name 
aimed exclusively [at the D & X.] There is no other abortion procedure which could be confused 
with that description."314 Second and third, the proscribed procedure requires partial delivery of 
the fetus into the vagina and completion of a "delivery" at the end of the procedure? 15 Kennedy 
elucidates, and the AMA concurs, "Only removal of an intact fetus can be described as a 
"delivery" of a fetus and only the D & X involves an intact fetus."316 By contrast, D & E leaves 
the physician with "a tray full of pieces," constituting neither delivery nor an intact fetus. 317 
Thus, as intended, Nebraska's law would only operate to prohibit D & X procedures, and would 
not operate to place a substantial obstacle on any woman seeking to abort. If a woman chose to 
abort, the common D & E procedure would still be available to her. As Nebraska's law serves 
legitimate State interests and does not have the purpose or effect of "deny[ing] women a safe 
abortion," the law imposes no undue burden on a woman's ability to decide to terminate her 
pregnancy. 
Part VII: Substantive Due Process under the 5th Amendment 
A. United States v. Windsor: the equal liberty of same sex marriage( majority opinion #5) 
In the recently decided Windsor318, the Court addressed the constitutionality of the 
Defense of Marriage Act's ("DOMA") definition of marriage. In relevant part, DOMA stated: 
312 /d. at 974. 
313 /d. 
"In determining the meaning of any Act of Congress, or of any ruling, regulation, 
or interpretation of the various administrative bureaus and agencies of the United 
314 /d.(quoting AMA Factsheet 3). 
315 !d. 
316 /d. 
317 /d. 
318 US v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013) (Kennedy, A., majority). 
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States, the word 'marriage' means only a legal union between one man and one 
woman as husband and wife, and the word 'spouse' refers only to a person of the 
opposite sex who is a husband or a wife."319 
Section 3 of DOMA, which defines "marriage" and "spouse," does not forbid States 
from enacting laws which permit same-sex marriage or civil unions.320 The section is, however, 
binding on over 1,000 federal laws and regulations.321 
Edith Windsor and Thea Spyer, both women, met in 1963 in New York, New York, and, 
soon after, entered into a romantic relationship.322 In 1993, after New York city extended the 
right to same-sex couples, Windsor and Spyer registered themselves as domestic partners.323 In 
2007, after 40 years of partnership, the couple married in Ontario, Canada and returned home to 
New York.324 The State ofNew York acknowledged the couple's marriage as valid.325 When 
Spyer died in 2009, she left her entire estate to Windsor.326 Windsor attempted to claim the 
estate tax exemption327 for surviving spouses, but her claim was denied because DOMA denied 
federal recognition to same-sex spouses.328 Subsequently, Windsor paid $363,053 in estate taxes 
and sought a refund for same from the IRS, who similarly denied Windsor's claim, concluding 
that she was not a surviving spouse under DOMA.329 
Windsor filed suit in federal court that DOMA violated equal protection under the Fifth 
Amendment. 330 While her suit was pending, the US Attorney General notified the Speaker of the 
House of Representatives that the Department of Justice "would no longer defend the 
319 1 U.S.C. § 7. 
320 Windsor, 133 S.Ct. at 2683. 
321 ld. 
322 ld. at 2682-2683. 
323 I d. at 2683. 
324 I d. at 2682. 
325 ld.at 2683. 
326 I d. at 2682. 
327 The federal estate tax exemption for surviving spouse "excludes from taxation "any interest in property which 
passes or has passed from the decedent to his surviving spouse." 26 U.S.C. § 2056(a). 
328 Windsor, 133 S.Ct. at 2683. 
329 ld. 
330 Jd. 
--- --- ----- ----------
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constitutionality of section 3 ofDOMA," the section which defined marriage and spouse.331 The 
court did, however, allow the Bipartisan Legal Advisory Group ("BLAG") of the House of 
Representatives to intervene as an interested party to defend the constitutionality of Section 3 of 
DOMA.332 The district court held that Section 3 ofDOMA was unconstitutional and ordered the 
government to pay Windsor her refund. 333 The Second Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed. 334 As 
of the date the Court heard Windsor, Windsor had not received her refund and the Executive 
Branch continued to enforce Section 3 ofDOMA.335 
As an initial matter, Kennedy, writing for a 5-4 majority, addressed standing and 
prudential concerns. The Court held that Windsor had standing to bring the case and that there 
was a justiciable controversy. 336 Windsor suffered an immediate, redressable economic injury 
when she was forced to pay estate taxes which she would be exempt from if not for the validity 
of§ 3 ofDOMA.337 While the government refused to defend the constitutionality of§ 3 of 
DOMA, there was still a justiciable controversy because, in refusing to give effect to the court's 
order to pay Windsor her refund, Windsor had a "concrete, persisting, and unredressed" 
injury."338 The Court stated that prudential concerns, which protect courts from "deciding 
abstract questions of wide public significance, would not prevent it from hearing the case, as 
such concerns were overridden by the participation of amici curae.339 Here, BLAG's defense of 
331 !d. 
332 !d. at 2684. 
333 !d. 
334 !d. 
335 !d. 
336 !d. at 2685. 
337 !d. 
338 !d. at 2685-2656. 
339 !d. at 2686-2687. 
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Section 3 ofDOMA's constitutionality assured the adversarial presentation of issues with 
vigor.340 
Kennedy begins his substantive analysis by noting an emerging awareness by states of 
same-sex marriage.341 Until recent years, many_. .Citizens likely had not considered the possibility 
of same-sex marriage, let alone that same-sex marriage might "aspire to occupy the same status 
and dignity as that of a man and woman in lawful marriage. "342 Over time, more and more 
States began to recognize same-sex marriage with the same recognition and validity as 
traditional marriage between a man and a woman. 343 Indeed, the emerging awareness from these 
States indicated that "limiting lawful marriage to heterosexual couples ... [was] an unjust 
exclusion."344 In particular, New York first recognized same-sex marriages performed 
elsewhere, and then amended its own marriage laws to permit same-sex marriage. 345 In doing so, 
New York enlarged the definition of marriage to "correct what its Citizens and elected 
representatives perceived to be an injustice that they had not earlier known or understood."346 
Defining and regulating marriage has been treated as a "virtually exclusive province of 
the states," subject to the condition that such laws must respect a person's constitutional rights.347 
The state has traditionally and historically possessed full, undelegated power over marriage and 
divorce. 348 Congress does have some ability to enact discrete statutes that bear on marital rights 
and privileges, but precedent indicates that such limited laws are only constitutional if they 
340 Jd at 2687-2688. 
341Jd.at 2689. 
342 ld 
343 ld 
344 Id 
345 Id 
346 Jd(emphasis added). 
347 ld at 2691. 
348 ld 
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regulate marriage's meaning in order to further federal policy.349 Consistent with this allocation 
of authority, the Federal Government has historically deferred to state-law policy decisions on 
marriage and divorce.350 
Comparing the much broader and less deferential DOMA against this rubric, Kennedy 
finds: 
"DOMA rejects the long-established precept that the incidents, benefits, and 
obligations of marriage are uniform for all married couples within each State, 
though they may vary, subject to constitutional guarantees, from one State to the 
next."35I 
Rather than focusing on potential federalism concerns, Kennedy's analysis here focuses 
1 
on the effect that the State's decision to grant same-sex marriage has on the same-sex married 
couple. 352 Kennedy explains, "the state's decision to give this class of persons the right to marry 
conferred upon them a dignity and status of immense import."353 When the State used its 
"historical and essential authority" to define marriage in this way, the State enhanced the 
"recognition, dignity, and protection of the class in their own community."354 Such language and 
rhetoric is typical of Kennedy's jurisprudential goal of putting liberty and its moral content at the 
heart of constitutional interpretation. Mirroring, and later quoting, his language in Lawrence, 
Kennedy affirms that the State's interest in defining and regulating marriage stems from its 
understanding that "marriage more than a routine classification for purpose of certain statutory 
benefits. "355 Instead, marriage and the intimacy it entails are "element[ s] in a personal bond that 
349 !d. at 2690. 
350 I d. at 2691. 
351 I d. at 2692. 
352 !d. 
353 Jd.' 
354 !d. 
355 !d. 
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is more enduring. "356 By recognizing the validity of same-sex marriage in its own and other 
jurisdictions, "New York sought to give further protection and dignity to that bond."357 
In light of this analysis, Kennedy holds that DOMA's definition of marriage is an 
unconstitutional deprivation of the liberty of persons protected by the Fifth Amendment.358 In 
essence, "DOMA seeks to injure the very class [that] New York seeks to protect."359 DOMA's 
unusual deviation from tradition involving defining marriage, the history ofDOMA's enactment, 
and its express and demonstrated purpose indicate a "bare Congressional desire to harm a 
politically unpopular group through disparate treatment of that group."36° First, DOMA departs 
from the history and tradition of federal reliance on state law to define marriage. 361 Second, the 
history ofDOMA's enactment indicates that interfering with the equal dignity of same-sex 
marriage was more than an incidental effect of its federal statute. It was its essence. "362 In 
House Report 3396, which discussed the passage ofDOMA, Congress stated, "it is both 
appropriate and necessary for Congress to do what it can to defend the institution of traditional 
heterosexual marriage."363 The House went on to conclude that DOMA expresses "both moral 
disapproval of homosexuality, and a moral conviction that heterosexuality better comports with 
traditional (especially Judeo-Christian) morality. "364 Further, the Act's "title and dynamics" 
,---- ......._ 
indicate its purpose ~~te same-sex marriage laws and, if unsuccessful, to restrict the 
-...._: "~" ·" ····"'···-
freedom of couples married under those laws. 365 The Act makes it clear that if any State does 
356 ld. 
357 ld. 
358 ld. at 2695. 
359 Jd.at 2693. 
360 Jd. 
361 ld. 
362 Jd. 
363 Jd.(quoting H.R.Rep. No. 104-664, pp. 12-13 (1996)). 
364 Jd.(quoting H.R.Rep. No. 104-664, pp. 19 (1996)). 
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decide to recognize same-sex marriage, those unions will be treated as "second-class marriages" 
under the federal law. 366 
Kennedy concludes, "though Congress has great authority to design laws to fit its own 
conception of sound national policy, it cannot deny the liberty protected by the Due Process 
Clause of the Fifth Amendment."367 Here, DOMA has the "prinE!J>urpose and the necessary 
effect ... of demean[ing] those persons who are in a lawful same-sex marriage," denigrating 
those persons to a "second-tier marriage."368 No legitimate policy purpose can overcome 
DOMA's purpose and effect of"disparag[ing] and injur[ing] those that the state sought to protect 
in personhood and dignity."369 The liberty protected by the Fifth Amendment's Due Process 
clause prohibits such disparate treatment under the law, rendering DOMA unconstitutional. 
Part VIII: Free Speech 
A. Texas v. Johnson: protecting political protest and the right to dissent (concurring opinion 
# 1) 
In Johnson, 370 the Court addressed the issue of flag desecration during political protest 
rallies. With Justice Brennan writing for a 5-4 majority, the Court held that defendant's act of 
burning an American flag during a protest rally constituted expressive conduct that was protected 
under the First Amendment.371 
While attending the Republican National Convention in Dallas in 1984, Johnson 
participated in a political protest entitled the "Republican War Chest Tour."372 The event 
protested the policies of Ronald Reagan's administration and certain Dallas-based 
366 /d. at 2693-2694. 
367 I d. at 2695. 
368 !d. at 2695, 2694. 
369 !d. at 2696. 
370 Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989)(Kennedy, A., concurring). 
371 !d. at 406. 
372 ld. at 399. 
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corporations. 373 Demonstrators marched through the streets of Dallas chanting political slogans 
and staging "die-ins," "intended to dramatize the consequences of nuclear war."374 Some 
protestors, but not Johnson, also spray-painted buildings and overturned potted plants.375 The 
protest culminated in front of Dallas City Hall.376 There, Johnson "unfurled an American flag, 
doused it in kerosene, and set it on fire," while protestors chanted, "America, the red, white, and 
blue, we spit on you. "377 While no one was injured, several witnesses attested to being 
"seriously offended" by the flag burning. 378 
Johnson was the only protestor to be charged with a crime?79 He was charged with 
"desecration of a venerated object ... [under] Tex.Penal Code Ann. § 42.09(a)(3) (1989)."380 
After trial, Johnson was convicted, and sentenced to one year in prison plus a $2,000 fine.381 
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed.382 The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals, however, 
reversed, holding that Johnson's flag burning was symbolic speech protected by the First 
Amendment. 383 
The Court held that based on the context of Johnson's flag burning being part of a 
political demonstration taking place near a political convention to nominate a Republican 
candidate to run for President, Johnson's action constituted expressive conduct protected by the 
First Amendment. 384 Brennan concludes, "if there is a bedrock principle underlying the First 
373 ld. 
374 ld. 
375 Jd. 
376 ld. 
377 ld. 
378 ld. 
379 I d. at 400. 
380 Jd. 
381 ld. 
382 ld. 
383 Jd. 
384 I d. at 406. 
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Amendment, it is that government may not prohibit expression of an idea simply because society 
finds [the] idea itself offensive or disagreeable. "385 
In his concurrence, Kennedy attests that, despite his and his fellow justices' very real 
disgust for what Johnson did, protecting Johnson's flag burning as expressive conduct is 
compelled by the Constitution. 386 Kennedy appears to write this opinion not for himself, but to 
clarify to the public that the Justices are only too aware of what the outcome of this decision is. 
To Kennedy, the cost of the jurisprudential goal of attempting to find and enforce the full and 
necessary meaning of liberty sometimes leads to unsavory or distasteful results. But, all the 
same, as appalling as the speech or expressive conduct may be, the Court is in some cases 
compelled to protect it in light of the moral content of liberty. Kennedy states, ""The hard fact is 
that sometimes we must make decisions we do not like. We make them because they are right, 
right in the sense that the law and the Constitution, as we see them, compel the result. "387 
Here, what the American flag represents commits the Court to protecting Johnson's flag 
burning as expressive conduct under the First Amendment.388 The American flag is a constant 
symbol of expressing beliefs and speech, beliefs in "law and peace and that freedom which 
sustains the human spirit."389 Kennedy somberly continues, "the case here today forces 
recognition of the costs to which those beliefs commit us."390 As perverse as it may sound, the 
very flag which Johnson burned protects his freedom to burn it. Accordingly, the Court had no 
choice but to affirm the holding of the Texas Criminal Court of Appeals. 
B. Hill v. Colorado: protecting political speech post-Casey (dissenting opinion# 2) 
385 !d. at 414. 
386 ld. at 421. 
387 Jd. at 420-421. 
388 I d. at 421. 
389 ld. 
390 ld. 
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In Hill,391 the Court upheld against a First Amendment challenge a criminal statute 
prohibiting any person from knowingly approaching another person within eight feet of a health 
care facility to provide the other with leaflets to engage in oral protest, education, or counseling, 
without the other's consent. Petitioners stated that, prior to the statute's enactment, they had 
enaged in "sidewalk counseling" on public walkways and sidewalks within 1 00 feet of facilities 
where abortions were performed. 392 In an opinion delivered by Justice Stevens, the majority held 
that the statute was a permissible content-neutral and viewpoint-neutral restriction on the time, 
place, and manner of speech. 393 The law was narrowly tailored to further substantial, legitimate 
government interests. 
Dissenting, Kennedy finds that the majority's position conflicts with "more than a half 
century of well-established First Amendment principles" and the essence of Casey. 394 
. Kennedy's discussion of free speech in Hill is palpably molded by his substantive views on 
abortion, attempting to find a balance between the constitutionality of abortion legislation and 
the larger conception of free speech under the First Amendment. 395 Kennedy uses rhetoric and 
oft-criticized paternalistic language typical of his abortion decisions to discuss the importance of 
social and moral debate on abortion, the psychology of women who consider abortion, and the 
potential for women who receive an abortion to suffer post-abortion regret.396 
Kennedy disdainfully declares, "[f]or the first time, the Court approves a law which bars 
v ·/ Private Citizens from passing a message, in a peaceful manner and on a profound moral issue, 
to a fellow Citizens on a public sidewalk. "397 To Kennedy, such a position in not in keeping with 
391 Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703 (2000)(Kennedy, A., dissenting). 
392 /d.at709. 
393 Jd.at 725-726. 
394 ld. at 765. 
395 See generally FRANK J. COLUCCI, supra, at p. 61. 
396 ld. 
397 !d. at 767. 
On Liberty: The Moral Concepts of Justice Kennedy's Jurisprudence 51 
the expansive right of free speech and the liberty interests attendant with that right. Since Casey 
prevents "pleas to the government to outlaw abortion" from having effect, opponents of abortion 
must seek to "convince their fellow Citizens of the moral imperative of their cause. "398 
Colorado's law plainly prevents opponents from voicing such concerns where it is most 
important, "the time and place where the act is about to occur," and to whom it is most 
important, those near the health facility who are about to receive the procedure.399 He continues, 
"we learn today that Citizens have a right to avoid unpopular speech in a public forum, a position 
that flies in the face of the First and Fourteenth Amendment"400 
Kennedy's analysis reveals that the statute is neither content nor viewpoint-neutral. First, 
Kennedy finds the statute to be content-based, as it restricts speech on particular topics.401 The 
law, as written, applies only to a special class of locations: "entrances to buildings with health 
care facilities. ,,4°2 Kennedy declares, "we would close our eyes to reality were we to deny that 
'oral protest, education, or counseling' outside the entrances to medical facilities concern a 
narrow range of topics-indeed, one topic in particular."403 By restricting speech in locations 
where the prohibited discourse occurs, the law is content-based.404 Kennedy quips, "clever 
content-based restrictions are no less offensive than censoring on the basis of content.405 Second, 
the statute is not viewpoint-neutral. The law's purpose and design are to very cleverly "restrict 
speakers on one side of the debate: those who protest abortions.',4°6 Kennedy concludes: 
398 ld. at 787-788. 
399 I d. at 788. 
400 ld. at 771. See also Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229, 237 (1963) ("The Fourteenth Amendment does not 
permit a State to make criminal the peaceful expression of unpopular views.") 
401 /d. at 767. 
402 /d. 
403 /d. 
404 Jd. at 767. 
405 /d. 
406 /d. at 768. 
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"To say that one Citizen{ can approach another to ask the time or the weather 
forecast or the direction to Main street, but not to initiate discussion on one of the 
most basic moral and political issues in all of contemporary discourse ... is an 
astonishing view of the First Amendment"407 
Additionally, Kennedy's dissent in Hill is noteworthy for its paternalistic language and 
idea that women suffer post-abortion regret. Emphasizing his rhetoric in Casey that an abortion 
decision must be "cautious and mature," Kennedy discusses the "profound difference" a leaflet 
can have on a woman's decisionmaking process. 408 He characterizes the woman considering 
abortion as "young" and "uninformed," and that abortion protestors are merely asking her to 
"understand and contemplate the nature of the life she carries within her."409 By providing a 
woman seeking an abortion with less information, it is more likely that she will come to regret 
such decision than if more information had been provided to her.410 In a decision that has 
consequences for both the woman and society, others can and should use their liberty to inform 
others through peaceful protest. 
C. International Society for Krishna Consciousness v. Lee: expanding the public forum 
(concurring opinion # 2) 
In Int'l Society for Krishna Consciousness,411 the International Society for Krishna 
Consciousness ("ISKCON"), a nonprofit religious corporation, challenged a New York Port 
Authority restriction banning the distribution of literature and solicitation of contributions in 
?'--. 
airport terminals. ISKCON members perform sankirtan, a ritual w~t~Jeto public places, 
disseminate religious literature, and solicit funds to support the religion.412 ISKCON sued for 
declaratory and injunctive relief, claiming the ban deprived its members of their First 
407 !d. 
408 !d. at 790. 
409 !d. at 789. 
410 See generally id. at 790. 
411 lnt'/ Soc 'y for Krishna Consciousness v. Lee, 112 S.Ct. 2701 (1992). 
412 ld. at 2703. 
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.Amendment rights.413 Analyzing the restriction under "traditional public forum" doctrine, the 
district court held that airport terminals were akin to public streets, and no argument had been 
evidenced that the ban was narrowly tailored to support a compelling state interest.414 
Accordingly, the district court granted ISKCON summary judgment.415 The Second Circuit 
Court of Appeals held that the ban on solicitation was reasonable, but the ban on distribution was 
Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for a 6-3 majority, upholds the Port Authorities' 
restrictions.417 As an initial matter, Rehnquist describes the "forum based" approach for 
assessing regulations that government places on the use of its property.418 In the first category of 
public property, regulations of speech on traditional public forums, government property that has 
"traditionally been available for public expression," is subject to the highest scrutiny.419 Such 
regulations are<t_~nly if they are "narrowly drawn to achieve a compelling state 
interest."420 In the second category, public property that is a "designated public forum," property 
that the State has opened for expressive activity by part or all of the public, is subject to the same 
highest scrutiny as traditional public forums.421 The third category is for nonpublic forums, 
constituting all remaining public property.422 Regulations ofnonpublic forums need only be 
reasonable, and will be upheld as long as the regulation is not an effort to "suppress the speaker's 
activity due to disagreement with the speaker's view."423 
413 I d. at 2704. 
414 ld. 
415 ld. 
416 ld. 
417 I d. at 2708. 
418 ld. at 2705. 
419 Jd. 
420 ld. 
421 ld. 
422 ld. 
423 ld. 
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Rehnquist concludes that precedent and history foreclose the possibility of airport 
terminals as a public fora. 424 A public forum must be made by "intentionally opening 
nontraditional forum for public discourse.425 No such effort has been made with airport 
./..--.......... 
terminals. Further, given how recently modem air terminals hav;t{~rose,jhey hardly qualify as 
,..-"..";-;··"t •· .... ::.~...-;.";<' • 
"immemorially" being held in the public trust and used for purposes of expressive activity.426 In 
fact, the tradition of airport activity does not demonstrate that airports have historically been 
made available for speech activity.427 ISKCON-style solicitation has only begun occurring in 
airport terminals in recent years. As such, airport terminals are only nonpublic forums. 
As nonpublic forums, restrictions on speech in airport terminals need only satisfy 
reasonableness.428 Rehnquist holds that this standard is met, as the regulation serves the airport's 
legitimate interest in assuring its travelers are not unduly interfered with by undesired 
solicitation. 429 
In his concurring opinion, Kennedy uses his expansive theory of free speech to enlarge 
the concept of public forums in order to better promote and protect the full and necessary 
meaning of liberty through diversity of expression.430 While concurring in the majority's 
judgment, Kennedy objects to the majority's analysis.431 Kennedy holds that airport terminals 
are public forums and that speech in those places is entitled to the highest scrutiny, but the 
challenged regulation is content-neutral and narrowly tailored to further a legitimate state 
interest. 432 
424 I d. at 2706. 
425 Jd. 
426 ld. 
427 ld. 
428 I d. at 2708. 
429 ld. 
430 See generally FRANK J. COLUCCI, supra, at p. 86. 
431 Jnt '/ Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, 112 S.Ct. at 2715. 
432 ld. 
,On Liberty: The Moral Concepts of Justice Kennedy's Jurisprudence 55 
Kennedy finds the majority's approach contrary to the public forum doctrine's underlying 
purposes.433 For Kennedy, the public forum doctrine recognizes the "limits of the government's 
control over speech activities on property [that is] suitable for free expression."434 It stands for 
the constitutional recognition that the government cannot impose silence on a free people, giving 
effect to the First Amendment's command to protect speech from government interference.435 At 
the heart of our jurisprudence, Kennedy states, lies the principle that the liberties protected by the 
Assembly, Speech, and Press Clauses of the First Amendment protect the rights of free Citizens 
to gather and speak with one another in public places. 436 
Kennedy's concept of the public forum doctrine would "accord public forum status to 
other forms of property, regardless of their ancient or contemporary origins and whether or not 
they fit within a narrow historic tradition."437 He rejects the majority's formulation, which 
incorrectly predicates the decision to confer public forum status on a property on the 
government's defined purpose for that property. 438 Such a concept of the public forum theory 
misunderstands the liberty interests justifying the theory, and prevents the Court from protecting 
the moral content of the liberties at issue. Under Kennedy's test, to determine whether public 
property is a public forum, the court must determine: 
433 Jd. at 2716. 
434 ld. at 2717. 
435 ld. 
436 ld. at2716. 
437 ld. at 2718. 
438 ld. at 2716. 
439 /d. at2718. 
"If the objective physical characteristics of the property at issue and the actual 
public access and uses that have been permitted by government indicate that 
expressive activity would be appropriate and compatible with those uses, the 
property is a public forum."439 
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Applying Kennedy's public forum test, it becomes "evident" that airport terminals are 
public forums.44° First, the district court's findings show that airports share physical similarities 
with public streets, a universally accepted public forum. 441 Second, airport terminals are open to 
the public without restriction.442 Lastly, given adequate time, place and manner regulations, 
expressive activity is very compatible with the uses of major airports.443 By applying Kennedy's 
test, the Court is better able to adapt the public forum theory to recognize new social realities 
which serve the same practical purposes as public squares in times past. 444 
Although he finds airport terminals to be public forums, like the majority, Kennedy 
upholds the Port Authority's challenged regulations.445 Since airport terminals are public 
forums, any regulation of speech at airport terminals is valid only if it is narrowly tailored to 
further a compelling state interest. 446 Kennedy explains that the bans are "either a reasonable 
time, place, and manner restriction, or . .. a regulation directed at the nonspeech element of 
expressive conduct. "447 As Kennedy understands it, the solicitation ban is directed at curbing the 
abusive practices attendant with in-person solicitation, particularly fraud and duress, and not at 
any particular "message, idea, or form of speech."448 As such, the regulation is a content-neutral 
rule that serves a significant government interest, and thus not violative of the First Amendment. 
D. Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission: protecting corporate political expression 
(majority opinion# 6) 
440 Jd. at2719. 
441 ld. 
442 ld. 
443 Jd. 
444 See generally FRANK J. COLUCCI, supra, at p. 86-87. 
445 Int'/ Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, 112 S.Ct. at 2720. 
446 Jd. at 2715. 
447 Jd. 
448 /d. at 2722. 
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In Citizens United, 449 the Court addressed governmental regulation of corporate political 
speech. In January 2008, Citizens United, a nonprofit corporation, made a movie named 
"Hillary: The Movie" ("Hillary"), a 90 minute political documentary about then-Senator and 
potential Democratic Party presidential candidate Hillary Clinton ("Clinton").450 To promote the 
film, Citizens United produced two 10-second ads and one 30-second ad on the movie, each of 
which included a short, "pejorative" statement about Senator Clinton, followed by the name of 
the movie and its Website address.451 While the movie was released in theaters and on DVD, 
Citizens United sought to make the movie available via video-on-demand within 30 days of the 
2008 primary elections.452 They were, however, concerned that Hillary and the ads promoting 
Hillary would subject them to civil and criminal penalties, as they might be covered by federal 
laws banning corporate-funded independent expenditures expressly advocating the defeat of a 
candidate and electioneering communication within 30 days of a primary.453 
Citizens United filed suit against the Federal Elections Commission ("FEC") seeking 
declaratory and injunctive relief, arguing that (1) 2 U.S.C. § 441(b) was unconstitutional as 
applied to Hillary and its ads; and (2) the Bipartisan Campaign reform Act of 2002 ("BCRA")454 
§ 203 was unconstitutional as applied to Hillary and its ads.455 456 The District Court denied 
Citizens United's motion for preliminary injunction, and granted the FEC's motion for summary 
449 Citizenss Unitedv. Federal Election Commission, 558 U.S. 310 (2010). 
450 I d. at 319. 
451 ld. 
452 Jd. 
453 Jd. at 321 (referring to§ 2 U.S.C 441(b) (2000 ed.) and 116 Stat. 81 through 116 Stat. 116). 
454 116 StatA~1 through 116 Stat. 116. 
455 Citizefi~s q nited, 558 U.S. at 320. 
456 Citiz~ss JUnited initially raised a facial challenge to the constitutionality of BCRA § 203, but expressly 
abandoned-the facial challenge on FEC 's motion for summary judgment. 1 :07--cv-2240--RCL-R WR, Docket Entry 
No. 52, pp. 1-2 (May 16, 2008). The parties later stipulated to dismissal ofthat claim. Jd. , Nos. 53 (May 2--2, 
2008), 54 (May 23, 2008), App. 6a. The Court, however, considers the case as a facial challenge. Citizenss fJnited, 
558 U.S. at 333. · __ _,..,., 
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judgment.457 The district court held that Hillary and its ads were susceptible to "no other 
interpretation" than informing the electorate that Clinton was "unfit for office and that viewers 
should vote against her."458 
The federal laws in question are§ 2 U.S.C. 44l(b) and the BCRA of2002. Under§ 
441 (b), as the court describes it: ~A. J!P. 
..,.,./"1 ~ ~ -.• .)l.JL' \. 
\..1 vvv~ 
"[C]orporations and unions from using general treasury funds to make direct 
contributions to candidates or independent expenditures that expressly advocate 
the election or defeat of a candidate, through any form of media, in ~onnection 
certain qualified federal elections. "459 
The BCRA of 2002 § 203 amended § 441 (b) to further prohibit any "electioneering 
communication." Electioneering communication is defined as: "any broadcast cable, or satellite 
communication" that "refers to a clearly identified candidate for Federal office" and is made 
within 30 days of a primary or 60 days of a general election."460 Additionally, electioneering 
communication must be "publically distributed."461 For potential Presidential nominee 
candidates, publically distributed means the communication "can be received by 50,000 or more 
persons in a State where a primary election ... is being held within 30 days."462 
Writing for the majority, Kennedy held that the "government may not, under the First 
Amendment, suppress political speech on the basis of the speaker's corporate identity," 
overruling the Court's decision in Austin and partially overruling its opinion in McConnell.463 
457 Citizenss United, 558 U.S. at 321. 
458 ld. 
459 Jd.at 320 (citing§ 2 U.S.C 44l(b) (2000 ed.))(emphasis added). 
460 § 434(t)(3)(A)). 
461 11 C.F.R. § 110.29(a)(2) (2009). 
462 11 C.F.R. § 100.29(b)(3)(ii). 
463 Citizenss United, 558 U.S. at 366. The Court's ruling in Citizenss United expressly overrules Austin v. Michigan 
Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652 (1990) and partially overrules McConnell v. Federal Elections Commission, 
540 U.S. 93 (2003). 
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Kennedy asserts, "the Government may regulate corporate political speech through disclaimer 
and disclosure requirements, but it may not suppress that speech altogether."464 
The Citizens United opinion represents a triumph for Kennedy, ratifying his expansive 
position on corporate speech in prior cases which treats corporations like individuals. Kennedy 
typically strikes most restrictions on campaign donations and campaign speech by individuals, 
organizations, and parties, viewing such laws as content-based restrictions of free speech and 
association.465 In Austin, the Court ~rd~~held a law preventing corporations from spending 
, .. "'"-. 
general treasury funds to support candidates for office.466 Kennedy held that the majority's 
decision deprived Citizens of information necessary to a democracy based solely on the identity 
of the speaker.467 Similarly, in McConnell, Kennedy voted to invalidate most of the BCRA, 
holding that the First Amendment guaranteed Citizens the right to judge for themselves the most 
effective means for expressing political views and to decide for themselves which entities to trust 
as reliable speakers. "468 
As an initial matter, Kennedy finds that Hillary was an "electioneering communication" 
under the BCRA § 203 and§ 441(b). 469 Per electioneering communication's definition, the 
video-on-demand showing of Hillary on cable television would be a cable communication that 
referred a clearly identified candidate for Federal office and that was made within 30 days of a 
primary election.470 The video-on-demand system, with its 3.5 million subscribers, would make 
it so the film was capable of being received by 50,000 persons or more, which the Court found to 
464 I d. at 319. 
465 s c ee FRANK J. OLUCCI, supra, at p. 81. 
466 Austin, 494 U.S. at 652. 
467 Austin, 494 U.S. at 700(Kennedy, A., dissent). 
468 McConnell, 540 U.S. at 286 (2003)(Kennedy, A., concurring in part, dissenting in part). 
469 Citizenss United, 558 U.S. at 323. 
470 !d. 
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be sufficient to satisfy the definition, regardless of how many actually ordered the film. 471 
Further, under § 441 (b), Hillary was functionally equivalent to express advocacy against electing 
Senator Clinton.472 A communication is functionally equivalent to express advocacy for or 
against electing a candidate only if, objectively, it is susceptible to "no reasonable interpretation 
other than as an appeal to vote for or against a specific candidate. "473 Here, Hillary was 
effectively a 90-minute "negative advertisement" urging viewers not to vote for Clinton.474 Most 
viewers of Hillary would likely find its import to be an "extended criticism of [Clinton's] 
character and her fitness for the office of the Presidency."475 
Next, Kennedy expounds on how the First Amendment protects political speech. He 
states, "the First Amendment has its fullest and most urgent application to speech uttered during 
a campaign for political office. "476 Laws which burden political speech are subject to strict 
scrutiny, requiring the government to show that the restriction furthers a compelling interest and 
is narrowly tailored to achieve that interest.477 Nonetheless, any law which creates content-based 
or viewpoint-based restrictions of speech is categorically prohibited under the First 
Amendment. 4 78 
Having established this background analysis, Kennedy discusses what these First 
Amendment protections of free speech really mean for corporations. Through a line of precedent 
ranging all the way back to 1952, the Court has recognized that First Amendment protections 
extend to corporations. 479 Kennedy makes the import of these precedents clear: "political speech 
471 !d. 
472 !d. at 325. 
473 !d. at 324-325. 
474 !d. at 325. 
475 !d. 
476 !d. at 339. 
477 !d. at 340. 
478 !d. at 340. 
479 !d. at 342. 
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does not lose [its] First Amendment protection simply because its source is a corporation. "480 
Instead, under the First Amendment and the full and necessary meaning of liberty, political 
speech is protected, regardless of its source. Whether political speech comes from a corporation 
or an individual, the speech still contributes to the free flow of information in democratic 
decisionmaking.481 Kennedy's concept of corporate political speech ignores the corporate form, 
treating the corporation as he would treat an individual. Thus, like an individual, the 
corporation's political speech is then a protected expression of its intimate beliefs and cannot be 
censored absent a compelling state interest. Accordingly, when a law restricts a corporation's 
political speech based on its status as a corporate entity, the law is an impermissible viewpoint-
based restriction, impinging on the corporation's liberty just as it would impinge on the liberty of 
a similarly placed individual. 
Here,§ 44l(b) and BCRA § 203 violated Citizens United's First Amendment rights by 
suppressing its political speech based solely on Citizens United's corporate identity.482 § 441(b) 
and BCRA § 203 's purpose and effect was to prevent corporations from presenting facts and 
opinions to the public based on their status as corporate entities.483 If the First Amendment's 
proclamation against viewpoint-based restrictions is to mean anything, it must mean that political 
speech cannot be given disparate treatment because it was made by a corporate speaker rather 
than an individual. Like an individual, Citizens United's political speech was a protected 
expression of its intimate beliefs, and the government did not state an interest sufficient to justify 
the speech's censor. Further, in restricting corporate speech,§ 441(b) and BCRA § 203 impeded 
the free flow of information to the public, impairing the ability of the electorate to make 
480 /d. 
481 See generally id. at 349. 
482 /d. at 365. 
483 Jd. at 355. 
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thoughtful, deliberate, and informed choices. Thus, in order to give effect to the moral content of 
liberty, the Court must find that§ 44l(b) and§ BCRA § 203 are impermissible restrictions on 
Citizens United's corporate political speech.484 
While the government could not suppress Citizens United's political speech, it could 
regulate Citizens United's speech through disclaimer and disclosure requirements. Disclaimer 
and disclosure requirements "burden the ability to speak ... but do not prevent anyone from 
speaking."485 In this manner, disclaimer and disclosure requirements are similar to the structural 
regulations to abortion that Kennedy discusses in Casey. Under the BCRA, televised 
electioneering communications funded by anyone other than the candidate must include a 
disclaimer identifying the person or entity responsible for the advertising's content.486 Here, 
Citizens United's three ads for Hillary were electioneering communications.487 The ads 
mentioned Clinton by name, were intended to be aired shortly before a primary, and contained 
pejorative references to her candidacy.488 The government could then validly require Citizens 
United to disclose that it was responsible for the ad, burdening Citizens United's ability to speak 
but not preventing it from speaking. 
Part IX: Conclusion 
Justice Kennedy's jurisprudence focuses on ensuring that liberty is given its full and 
necessary meaning under the Constitution as we understand it. The Constitution has "spacious 
phrases," with general concepts that have moral content. Judges have an obligation to define and 
484 While Kennedy acknowledges that Citizenss United wholly overrules Austin, he does not see this to be a 
problem. To Kennedy, Austin itself contravened the Court's earlier precedents in Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 
(1976) and First Nat. Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, (1978). !d. at 363. Further, Austin was not well-
reasoned, had been undermined by "experience since" and rapid changes in technology, and had no serious reliance 
interests at stake. I d. at 363-365. Consequently, the Court could properly overrule Austin. 
485 !d. at 366(quoting Buckley, 424 U.S. at 64). 
486 !d. at 366. 
487 /d. at 368. 
488 !d. at 368. 
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enforce this moral content. In performing this duty, judges may look to traditional sources, such 
as tradition and history, or non-traditional sources, such as emerging political awareness and 
international law, to provide objective referents for liberty. In applying this jurisprudential 
philosophy on a case-by-case basis, Kennedy has been unpredictable in result, but consistent in 
substance. Over the last 25 years, this content-consistent "unpredictability" has allowed 
Kennedy to consistently write in and for the majority, molding the Court's opinions to reflect his 
careful, reasoned beliefs and shaping the course of United States jurisprudence for years to come. 
